Israelis, Palestinians and ‘Love Island’

I have a confession to make: I am one of those few weirdos who never bothered to watch an episode of Love Island.  Which is why my knowledge of this TV show is second-hand at best; and why using this metaphor is – I have to admit – a bit of a cheap trick to get you hooked, dear reader.

I understand the attractions of love – but why on an island?  Perhaps because islands have that strange allure: they are constrained geographies suggestive of enforced isolation from without and imposed intimacy within.

From Gauguin to Attenborough, from Defoe to Swift, we’re all fascinated by islands.  They are world’s quintessential test tubes: riveting experiments in natural and social eccentricity.


With their rich, often over-the-top imagination, ‘pro-Palestinian’ activists could not possibly have missed the metaphoric potential of islands.  They harnessed that potential ‘for the cause’ by portraying the Palestinian Authority-governed areas of the West Bank (defined in the Oslo Accords) as an ‘archipelago’ of small islands in a ‘sea’ of Israeli ‘settlements’.  Such allegoric maps travel far and reach wide; their message is clear: a patchwork of Palestinian ‘islands’ cannot be turned into a viable state.

Not satisfied with the mere allegory, some activists are shouting that message in full-throated, indignant, moralising voice: it is too late for the two state solution.  Often, they blame Netanyahu and ‘his settlements’; but Seumas Milne (a former journalist and currently top courtier to Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn) suggested, even 15 years ago, that the two-state solution was no longer achievable.

Among certain ‘pro-Israel’ activists (and even among some Israelis), such suggestions are a source of dread and despair.  In the absence of a Palestinian state, they say, Israel’s choices are grim: either ‘one-state’ in which Jews will be (or will quickly become) a minority; or else an apartheid state – in which the Palestinians won’t possess full political rights.

A recent Jewish Chronicle article quotes Tal Keinan, an American-Israeli businessman and former Israeli fighter pilot, who argues that there are “only three possible endgames” for Israel:

"The first is that Israel could annex the West Bank and give its Arab residents citizenship – which would mean Israel ‘opening itself to the prospect of demographic suicide’. […]

The second option would be to annex the Palestinian territories without granting the Palestinians citizenship – imposing sovereignty on a large number of people without representation. […]

The final option […] is for Israel to withdraw from most of the territories, with or without an agreement with the Palestinians. If the Palestinians build a state, there will be a state, but if not, the West Bank ‘will likely become another rocket base’."

So there you are: the options are oblivion, apartheid or being bombed to smithereens.  As the current British Prime Minister would put it, doom or gloom!

There’s a debate to be had on whether it is indeed too late for the ‘two state solution’; and whether lack of ‘full political rights’ equals ‘apartheid’.  But I do not wish to go there now.  My question is: are those ‘3 choices’ really the only possible ‘endgames’?  Or are the prophets of doom merely demonstrating their own stale thought processes, their own lack of imagination and creativity?

I am fascinated by islands.  They are such interesting places!  Let’s let our minds travel to a few islands – and see what we can learn.

A ‘Great’ Britain with some little ‘dependencies’

To start with, I won’t have to travel too far: I live on the island of Britain, which some (both on and outside it) still sometimes call ‘England’.  But it isn’t ‘England’ – the island of Britain is part of a sovereign state called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  Although it is not formally called a federation, this is in fact a federal state made up of four ‘countries’: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – each of them endowed with a great deal of political, economic and cultural autonomy.  Nonetheless, there are nationalist movements in each of these ‘countries’, aspiring to more autonomy and even to outright secession from the federation. 

I have recently travelled to Scotland, where great efforts are being made to revive and expand the use of Scottish Gaelic.  Upon return to London, I discovered that I still had a pocketful of Scottish banknotes.  The ‘Scottish pound sterling’ is worth exactly as much as the ‘British (not English!) pound sterling’; but the banknotes are underwritten by the Royal Bank of Scotland and bear different images from their ‘British’ counterparts.  Those strange-looking banknotes may be legal tender throughout the UK; but they are, let me tell you, viewed with suspicion by London retailers, many of whom seem to see them for the first time.

Another ‘country’ – Wales – occupies a peninsula in the West of Britain.  Wales is very similar in size to Israel, but it is less densely populated.  The vast majority of its inhabitants speak English and only one in five has Welsh as their mother tongue.  Still, Welsh is an official language in Wales, on a par with English; no expenses are spared – everything (from road signs to court summons) is written in both languages.  And children have to study Welsh in school, whether they have any use for it or not.

But ‘Great’ Britain is not as interesting as some of the smaller islands off its coast.  Take for instance the Isle of Man, a territory just one-and-a-half times the size of Gaza Strip.  The Isle isn’t part of the United Kingdom; nor is it a sovereign, independent state.  It is, instead, defined as a ‘British Crown Dependency’.  If you think that this means ‘owned by the Queen’ – think again: Queen Elizabeth the Second could not sell off that piece of real estate to – say – Donald Trump; even if he was interested and however much Her Majesty wanted to oblige!

Most Isle of Man inhabitants have the status of ‘Manxmen’ (and Manxwomen?)  Manxmen are ‘in principle’ British citizens; in principle only, because they cannot, for instance, vote in UK national elections and are hence not represented in the UK Parliament.  Although decisions made in that Parliament can have a huge impact upon their lives.  For instance, Manxmen could not vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum.  But, although the island is not part of the United Kingdom – and also not part of the European Union – its economy is strongly affected by the trade between the two…

Manxmen do elect the 24 members of the House of Keys – the lower chamber of the local ‘Parliament’, which deals with most internal matters.  Issues pertaining to defence, international relations, as well as the final say on matters of ‘good governance’, however, are the competence of the UK government and parliament.

Fiercely dependent:
Manxmen are proud citizens of a British Crown 'Dependency'

Upon application, Manxmen are issued with specially printed  British passports.  But instead of ‘United Kingdom’, those passports declare their bearers citizens of a strange entity called ‘British Islands – the Isle of Man’.  Such passports allow Manxmen to travel to – for instance – EU countries; but, unlike ‘regular’ British citizens, they are not entitled to work there.  Nor are EU nationals entitled to work on the Isle of Man, although they (still) can work in the UK.


The British Crown possesses also other ‘Dependencies’ – including several islands in the English Channel/La Manche: Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark.  Each island is governed separately, according to its own traditional system, mostly originating in the early Middle Ages.  Their combined population is estimated at around 165,000.  None of the Channel Islands is represented in the UK Parliament and, as a rule, their ‘citizens’ cannot vote in UK national elections and referenda.  Their status is, roughly speaking, similar to that of Manxmen.

Something is rotten in the state of Denmark

If we let our mind fly north-west of Britain, across the North Atlantic ocean, we come across Donald Trump’s latest real-estate project: Greenland.  It is the world’s most sparsely populated ‘country’ – with just one inhabitant on average per 10 square miles of territory; but it is also the world’s largest island: circa 10 times larger than Great Britain and 100 times larger than Tiny Israel.

Politically, Greenland is defined as an ‘autonomous region’ of the Kingdom of Denmark – a ‘region’ 50 times larger than Denmark-proper.  Some call it a ‘constituent country’ – similar in principle to the status of Scotland or Wales within the UK.

Happy Greenlanders

The majority of Greenland’s population (circa 88%) belongs to the indigenous Inuit (a.k.a. Eskimo) ethnicity, akin to the natives of North Canada and Alaska.  They speak their own language.  The balance consists of Danish settlers.

Greenlanders elect 2 representatives to Denmark’s parliament, out of a total of 179.  They also elect the 31 members of Greenland’s own parliament, which in turn elects a local government with a high degree of internal autonomy.  However, the Danish government sitting in Copenhagen is responsible for decisions pertaining to defence and international relations; even for those that directly affect the inhabitants of the ‘constituent country’ of Greenland – such as the permission to locate nuclear weapons on the island.

In 1973, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland) became a member state of the European Community – precursor to the European Union.  But, using its greater autonomy achieved in 1979, Greenland voted in 1982 to leave the economic block – and completed that exit by 1985.  It is no longer part of the European Union; but it is still part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a member state of the European Union…

Economically, Greenland has long been highly dependent on Denmark.  However, for the past decade or so, the Greenlandic government has worked steadily to gradually reduce the economic dependence, with the ultimate goal of attaining political independence.

The Kingdom of Denmark ‘owns’ also another ‘constituent country’: the Faroe Islands.  Their status is roughly similar to that of Greenland: the Faroese elect 2 members of the Danish Parliament, as well as all 33 members of the local parliament.  Just like in Greenland, there is a local government, led by a Prime Minister; there is also a strong movement demanding political independence.  A separate Faroese Constitution drafted in 2011 has been rejected by the Danish government of the time, as ‘incompatible’ and ‘cannot co-exist’ with the Danish Constitution.

The poor ‘rich harbour’

By now, you probably think that ‘special status’ islands are but vestiges of medieval kingdoms, bizarre anachronisms somehow preserved into modernity.  Well, not exactly: some of them are part of relatively young republics.

One such island is Puerto Rico.  ‘Discovered’ by Columbus, it was incorporated into the Spanish Empire and colonised by (mainly) Spanish settlers, who wiped out the indigenous population and culture.  But in 1898, it was conquered by the United States.

The term ‘colony’ is not en-vogue any more; but Puerto Rico is not a federal US state, nor is it part of a state.  It is, therefore, defined these days as a ‘United States unincorporated territory’.  In this context, ‘unincorporated’ means that the US Constitution does not apply in full: only ‘fundamental rights’ are protected, other constitutional rights are not.  As a consequence, although the Puerto Ricans are ‘in principle’ US citizens (since 1917), they cannot vote in US presidential elections and do not have senators or voting representatives in the US Congress.  Instead, the 3.2 million Puerto Ricans elect a local Governor and a bi-cameral parliament.  However, the head of state is the President of the United States.  The jurisdiction and sovereignty belongs to the United States of America and the ultimate power is vested in the US Congress.  Laws adopted by the latter apply to Puerto Rico by default.  Many US federal agencies (notably the FBI) are active in Puerto Rico.

A very lonely star...
Puerto Rico calls itself Estado Libre (Free State). But it is neither an independent state, nor a US state.

As US citizens, Puerto Ricans can serve in the US military – in fact they were historically forced to serve whenever the US adopted compulsory military draft.  However, Puerto Rico also has its own National Guard, distinct from the US National Guard.  The commander-in-chief of the Puerto Rican National Guard is… the President of the United States.

On average, Puerto Ricans are significantly poorer than the citizens of the State of Mississippi – the poorest of US states.

US controls a few other ‘unincorporated territories’ with roughly similar regimes – and they happen to also be islands: Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa.

And a ‘fragrant’ harbour

I never noticed any particularly pleasant smell when I visited Hong Kong, but many believe that ‘Fragrant Harbour’ (hēung gong in Cantonese) is the origin of the modern name.
Hong Kong consists of the eponymous island, plus an archipelago of some 200 other islands and two small pieces of territory on the coast of Southern China.  In total, it is not much larger than the Gaza Strip – but it is more densely populated: more than 17,500 inhabitants per square mile, compared to Gaza’s 13,000.

How to live on an archipelago:
one can travel among the main islands of Hong Kong by underground train.

In theory, Hong Kong is part and parcel of the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China.  But it certainly does not feel that way.  And it’s not just a matter of a different flag, state symbols and anthem.

The official language of China is Mandarin – written with simplified Chinese characters.  In Hong Kong, it is Cantonese, inscribed with traditional characters.  Which render anything spoken or written in Hong Kong unintelligible to most people in China.

Cars cling to the left side of the road in Hong Kong, still following the British tradition; but they are driven on the right in China.

Five years ago, I travelled to China via Hong Kong.  To start with, I had to apply for a Chinese visa; but when I finally got it, was told that it’s not valid in Hong Kong – where one needs a separate visa; or, in the case of my Israeli passport, no visa for Hong Kong, yes visa for China.

Flights from Hong Kong to Beijing are expensive, as they are considered international flights.  I was advised, instead, to buy a seat on one of the many cars and coaches ferrying passengers from Hong Kong Airport to Shenzhen Airport just across the border with China.  I do not use the term ‘border’ lightly: en-route to Shenzhen, my passport was checked twice, within a 50 yards stretch of road: first by the border police of Hong Kong, then by Chinese border officials.

Once at Shenzhen Airport, I boarded a much cheaper, probably subsidised ‘domestic’ flight to Beijing.

I paid for the transfer from Hong Kong to Shenzhen with Hong Kong dollars, but they’re not legal tender in China; so I had to buy the flight ticket Beijing with Chinese ‘renmimbi’, not accepted in Hong Kong.

All this may sound and feel strange, given that Hong Kong is not an independent state.  Officially, Hong Kong is called a ‘Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China’.  But in this case, ‘special’ is an understatement.

As I am writing this, there are widespread protests in Hong Kong against Chinese ‘interference’ – protests triggered by a change in law allowing certain offenders to be ‘extradited’ from Hong Kong to... another part of China’s ‘sovereign territory’.  Go figure!

So what?

By now, I can hear quite a few of you grumbling: what do all these islands have to do with anything?  Israel has occasionally been called ‘an island’ – as in ‘an island of freedom in a sea of tyranny’; but geographically it certainly is no island.

Well, I’m afraid I used the ‘islands’ allegory only as a crafty rhetorical device.  This isn’t just about islands, there are many other, ‘continental’ examples.

The point is that the ‘sovereign state/no state’ paradigm is based on a false dichotomy.  Reality is much more complex than that; there are almost-states, states-within-states, incorporated ‘unincorporated territories’, ‘constituent countries’, ‘special administrative regions’ and a myriad other ‘unconventional’ political constructs.

It may be that none of the existing models described above precisely fits the requirements of a future Israel-Palestinian Arabs accommodation.  But what these ‘islands’ prove is that there’s a huge breadth of possibilities – rather than a binary option.

Human beings are endowed with imagination, creativity and problem-solving abilities.  They are also ‘tribal’ and seek self-determination: the right to control their destiny, while organising themselves along ‘tribal’ identities that both unite and divide.  And, as a result of all that, human communities have evolved and are evolving in many complex, unusual, original ways.  Because no man is an island; not even on the Isle of Man.

The conflict between Jews and Arabs – or between ‘Israelis’ and ‘Palestinians’ – is a conflict between right and right.  Not a dilemma, or even a multiple-choice question; but an art project, a piece of blank canvas.

We live in a world of endless possibilities.  There are no slim choices, just narrow minds; mankind doesn't inhabit rigid, tidy little boxes – only some men do.

The 'Intelligence squared' debate

Anti-Israel ‘events’ are as numerous as midges in Scotland.  Most are small meetings of like minded ‘anti-Zionists’ vociferously agreeing that the Jewish state is the number 1 source of global evil.  The ‘opposition’ is very rarely represented; after all, the organisers of such ‘events’ typically aren’t interested in democratic debate – and certainly not when it involves ‘Zionists’.

There are rare exceptions: on 17 June 2019, an outfit called ‘Intelligence²’ (intelligence squared) organised a debate with the participation of both sides: the ‘Zionist’ and the ‘anti-Zionist’ camps – each represented by two speakers.  The ‘motion’ proposed to the audience was ‘Anti-Zionism is Antisemitism’.

The pre-debate vote showed 15% of the audience in favour (i.e., believing that ‘Anti-Zionism is Antisemitism’), 59% against and 26% undecided – so it can be inferred that ‘anti-Zionists’ were attending in numbers.  The post-debate poll showed 19% of the audience in favour, 76% against and 5% undecided.  Basically  – a defeat for the ‘Zionist’ side.  I’m one of those who – had I attended the event – would have voted in favour to start with.  So I watched the debate with interest on YouTube – and proceeded, for my many sins, to put pen to paper and tell you what I thought about it.

Before the debate even started, the moderator produced a definition of anti-Zionism:

“[O]pposition to the existence of a Jewish state in the territory defined as the historic land of Israel or Palestine."

That, of course, should have been not the beginning, but the end of the debate.  After all, multiple opinion polls (see this for instance) have shown that, for the vast majority of Jews – to the tune of 80-95% – Israel ‘is an ‘essential’ or at least ‘important’ part of their identity.  In other words, ‘anti-Zionists’ propose to dismantle a major pillar of Jewish identity, while at the same time proclaiming that they are not antisemites.

The moderator also told the audience that

“Now, surveys suggest that Israel is one of the most disliked nations in the world along with Iran and North Korea…"

That was, of course, yet another opportunity to put the debate to bed without any further waste of everybody’s time.  Iran is a theocracy that hangs people for ‘crimes’ like ‘waging war against God’ and ‘spreading corruption on earth’.  North Korea is a Communist dictatorship that – among many other things – operates ‘labour camps’ in which tens of thousands of political prisoners are killed through starvation, exhaustion and exposure.  Israel – warts and all – is a liberal democracy ruled by laws that, by and large, are in line with those of the UK, EU, USA and Canada.  Even according to the United Nations Human Development Index, Israel ranks 22 out of 189 countries – ahead of France (24), Spain (26) and Italy (28).  So what’s the reason for so much ‘dislike’?  Is it a mere coincidence that “one of the most disliked nations” happens to be made up of Jews – the same nation that has been ‘disliked’, berated and hounded for centuries??

Oddly (some would think), at the ‘Intelligence²’ event the Zionist speakers did not use these arguments.  In fact, they treated this public debate as if it were an academic one; they engaged in cogent and sometimes convoluted arguments, with great intelligence, but little flair.  They displayed much intellect but little charisma, lots of logic but few rhetorical sparks.

Here’s a passage from those first of the ‘Zionist’ speakers, journalist Melanie Phillips:

“The Jews are the only extant indigenous people of the land.  Israel was their kingdom more than three thousand years ago, they were driven out when it was occupied, they maintained a continuous presence in the land under the waves of colonialism – Assyrian, Roman, Abbasid, Mamluk, Ottoman and British –, they fought off Arab colonialists to re-establish their state in 1948 and are still fighting off Arab colonialism.  When the Palestine Mandate of 1922 which parcelled out of the former Ottoman Empire, it enshrined their right to settle throughout that land, a right that endures unaltered in international law the law also entitles Israel to hold onto land seized from its attackers…"

This was no doubt a good history lesson; but listing all the ‘colonialists’ who ruled the Land of Israel from early antiquity to modern times was most likely wasted on a non-academic audience.  Add a rather monotonous, colourless delivery and there you have it: a collection of erudite arguments, well-anchored in distant history and complex articles of law – but utterly bereft of oratorical effect and emotional impact.

If lack of eloquence were a capital sin, the Zionists would fortunately not be lonely in hell: the first ‘anti-Zionist’ speaker – Israeli-born Communist politician-turned-historian Ilan Pappé – also produced a rather lacklustre performance:

“For those who claim that anti-Zionism is a refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist I would say that states do not exist by right, they’re found… they are founded by historical processes and they become a fait accompli.  The debate is about the nature of the state and the regime, we are all entitled to wish for and work for a better, more just and egalitarian state for everyone who lives in Israel, in Palestine and for those who were expelled from there.  In 1975 a vast majority of the United Nation member states defied Zion… defined Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination, it was passed with the same majority that passed the 1947 resolution recognizing Israel, the difference was that in 1947 the colonized world was not represented in the United Nations. In 1975 it was there, it was still trying to find its way in the post-colonial world. The third world discuss… equated Zionism with continued colonialism.  Alas neoliberalism corruption in post-colonial politically… in post-colonial political system… a corruption in the post-colonial political system, an aggressive American imperialism have cast it to the sideways of history this impulse and energy but at its height and within it anti-Zionism was part of the wish of the colonized people to build a better and more just world…”

Humour and sarcasm are great persuaders and Pappé did attempt them a couple of times.  Many in the audience would no doubt have laughed sympathetically, had they understood he was trying to be witty; but they didn’t.

Of course, even a humourless and flat-footed Ilan Pappé still has a great advantage as a speaker: a freak ‘anti-Zionist’ Israeli is by definition interesting – it’s the ‘man bites dog’ effect.

By the way, Pappé himself mixed up ‘antisemitism’ and ‘anti-Zionism’ several times during his speech – he had to stop and correct himself.  Yet neither ‘Zionist’ speaker cared to point out – for the sake of the rhetorical effect if nothing else – that this may have been a Freudian mistake…

Pappé was followed by the second ‘Zionist’ speaker – former Member of Knesset turned academic Einat Wilf.  To my surprise (I heard her speak before), the speech owed too much to her current occupation and too little to the former one: this was another presentation heavy on facts and structure and light in emotional effect.  True, her obvious passion did shine through at times; but even then, the language was unnecessarily formal, the logic somewhat convoluted and the delivery unremarkable:

“We now know that antisemitism arose from a deep crisis in the society doing the blaming.  After all, these templates and ways of thinking about my people have been around for millennia; yet they become particularly useful in times of crisis and we are indeed again a species in crisis.  Technology questions the very intelligent of humanity; extreme weather undermines our confidence in our control; inequality undermines our ideal progress, our leaders or lack thereof leave us feeling bereft of a sense there's a steady hand at the helm.  And in times of crisis we desperately crave certainty and there are few greater certainties in this world to grab on than that the Jews are to blame…"

Don’t get me wrong: to me, all this makes sense and sounds familiar; but psychoanalysing antisemitism, even in the context of a bigger point, does little to persuade people that ‘Anti-Zionism is antisemitism’.

Thus far, the debate was, politely speaking, ‘interesting’.  It was about to became ‘exciting’ once Mehdi Hassan – Al-Jazeera journalist and the second speaker for the opposition – jumped into the ring.  Hasan is a pro.  He is naturally articulate, sharp and linguistically agile.  Just as important, he is familiar with this ‘debate’ format.  He knows this is about persuading people; it’s nothing like defending an academic dissertation.  In this type of ‘debate’, sharp rhetoric wins over dull substance – hands down.  In this type of debate, being accurate is hardly a priority – one can get away with twisted facts and iffy comparisons, because there’s just not enough time and span of attention to challenge them.  It’s about stirring emotions, not conveying information.

And because of all that, Mehdi Hasan single-handedly won the ‘debate’.  He didn’t even have to break a sweat: this was an unequal match; it felt like some professional snooker champion (say Ronnie O’Sullivan) was playing amateur pool players picked up from some country pub.

But it wasn’t all style and rhetoric – it was also strategy: both Melanie Phillips and Einat Wilf (and, to a certain extent, Ilan Pappé too) played defence.  Hasan demonstrated once again that, in political ‘debates’ just like in military confrontations, one needs to attack if one wishes to win.  He started his address, therefore, by wiping the floor with the motion and its defenders:

“Ladies and gentlemen we have been witnessing tonight a deeply cynical proposition to deliver a farrago of straw men distortions, deflections, false accusations and of course straight-up pro-Israel propaganda.  Then again hearing Melanie Phillips come here and champion the rights of gays in Israel in order to defend Zionism was well worth the entry ticket in and of itself."

Audiences at political debates are not like jurors in a courtroom.  They don’t necessarily ask for evidence – their fickle opinions can often be carried by a strong, passionate, determinate statement.  Of course, Melanie Phillips had mentioned the word ‘gays’ only once in her speech, when she stated that Israel is

“the only country in the Middle East where […] women and gays can live in freedom"

Hardly ‘championing’ anyone’s rights – more like a statement of fact.

Phillips could have (should have?) responded to that ad hominem attack, for instance by pointing out that, in a sermon delivered to the Islamic Unity Society, the oh-so-liberal Mehdi Hasan referred to the “kuffar [the Quranic Arabic term for heretics], the disbelievers, the atheists” as “cattle”.

Instead, she declared:

“I am sure that Mehdi Hasan and Ilan Pappé are deeply honourable men.  I would not presume to say what is in their minds or what their motivation is…"

Courtesy is such a nice thing, ‘innit?  Unfortunately, as Mehdi Hasan proceeded to demonstrate, it is not niceties that win a political debate.

So, back to Mehdi Hasan’s speech.  His next step was to re-state the proposed motion in a way that made it look unreasonable – indeed absurd – to the audience:

“[T]he motion says ridiculously, sweepingly, offensively, ahistorically that anti-Zionism is antisemitism that merely being opposed to Zionism – a political ideology, remember – is inherently, by definition, it's ipso facto antisemitic.  Which is absurd."

Put in this way, the motion does look ridiculous: how can opposing a political ideology equate racism?  Surely people have the right to question, criticise and oppose political ideologies.

Except that Hasan did not ‘interpret’ the motion, he (radically) misinterpreted it.  In fact, he managed to sneak past the largely unsuspecting audience two fundamental untruths.

To start with, Zionism is not a “political ideology”, despite Hasan’s surreptitious characterisation.  He counted (correctly, as it turned out), on people to ‘buy’ that, because of the ‘ism’ suffix.  Of course, many things are called an ‘ism’ (baptism, barbarism, criticism, plagiarism, etc.) – this does not make them political ideologies.

Wikipedia defines the term ‘political ideology’ as

“a certain set of ethical ideals, principles, doctrines, myths or symbols of a social movement, institution, class or large group that explains how society should work and offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order."

But Zionism isn’t concerned with “how society should work”.  It offers no “blueprint for a certain social order” has no global ambitions or implications, it is confined to one people and one (small) piece of territory.  One can be a left wing Zionist, a right-wing Zionist, a liberal Zionist or a conservative Zionist, a profoundly religious Zionist or a militantly atheist Zionist.  The difference between Zionism and ideology becomes self-evident if one considers the Israeli political spectrum: Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, Labour leader Amir Peretz and Aryeh Deri (Chairman of the Mizrakhi Ultra-Orthodox party Shas) are all Zionists; yet they advocate radically different (if not diametrically opposed) blueprints of social order.

In fact, in its ‘modern’ version, Zionism can best be described as a national emancipation movement, not fundamentally different from similar tendencies found among other ethnic groups – from the 19^th century onwards.

Some may seek to ignore the differences between ‘national emancipation movement’ and ‘nationalism’.  The latter can be construed as an ideology – if one sees it as driving a certain world order.  Consequently, one can be an ‘anti-nationalist’ without being accused of racism.  But, even if one declares Zionism as nothing but the Jewish form of nationalism, this begs the question: why do ‘anti-Zionists’ attack with such venom just one embodiment of nationalism?  Why would one fundamentally object to a Jewish state, but not to an Indian state, a Pakistani state, a Serbian state, a Croatian state, etc.?

Which brings me to Mehdi Hasan’s second untruth: his underlying suggestion that anti-Zionism is nothing but opposition to Zionism – “a political ideology” in his words.  Sounds perfectly plausible – but it’s still utterly false.  Let us remember the definition that was issued at the beginning of the debate – a definition to which all speakers would willingly subscribe.  ‘Anti-Zionism’ is not just opposition to Zionism; it is:

“[O]pposition to the existence of a Jewish state in the territory defined as the historic land of Israel or Palestine."

Contemporary ‘anti-Zionism’ (as opposed to pre-1948 anti-Zionism) does not oppose a future political outcome; rather, it wishes to dismantle an already-constituted nation state.  Or, at the very least, to change its character beyond recognition, contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the overwhelming majority of its citizens.

And, as indicated already, ‘anti-Zionism’ does not propose to dismantle all nation states – or even a number of nation states.  It takes issue with just one nation state – the Jewish state.

Once Mehdi Hasan’s untruths are exposed, the motion ‘Anti-Zionism is antisemitism’ does not look at all ridiculous or sweeping.

We are still left with ‘ahistorical’, by which – I presume – Hasan means his contention that

“many victims of the Holocaust opposed Zionism; on the other hand many antisemites supported Zionism."

Of course, pre-1948 there were indeed many Jews who opposed Zionism.  But, does that matter?  Every national emancipation movement has its opponents.  It can hardly be claimed that, after World War I, all Arabs supported independence from the Ottoman Empire.  For many – perhaps even for the majority – that empire was the latest embodiment of the scripturally prescribed Islamic Caliphate.  But is that a valid argument for dismantling any of today’s 22 independent Arab states?  Can one seriously try to resurrect the pre-1947 Indian opponents of Gandhi to justify dismantling the state of India?  Or forcibly merging it with Pakistan?

As for “many antisemites supported Zionism”, Hasan would have great difficulty listing those “many” without resorting to ridiculous, Ken Livingston-esque statements like ‘Hitler supported Zionism’.  The best he could do during the debate was to claim – based on one random statement – that Balfour was an antisemite.  But, again: does all this matter?  Even if we accept as given that Balfour was both an antisemite and a supporter of Zionism, so what?  Saying ‘Anti-Zionism is antisemitism’ does not imply that only ‘anti-Zionists’ are antisemites, or that every supporter of Zionism must be free from antisemitic prejudice.  Human beings are complex; one can harbour racist prejudice, even while supporting anti-racist causes.  The fact that Abraham Lincoln and prominent members of the abolitionist movement harboured what would rightly be seen today as racist views cannot be used to justify slavery or to tar the cause of its eradication.

Hasan’s next argument was that denying Jews the right of self-determination isn’t antisemitism, because

“not every national, ethnic group that wants a state gets a state.  Ask the Kurds, ask the Catalans, ask the Scots – there are more than 5,000 ethnic groups in the world today but only 193 member states at the United Nations…"

He then went on to point at the Druze citizens of Israel

“do they have a right of self-determination if they create a Druze state inside of Israel?"

Moreover, Hasan argued:

“It's not racist for the Kurds to aspire to statehood […], but the flip side of that is true as well: the British government, the American government, most of the EU governments do not support Kurdish statehood; does that mean the British government, all of us, are racist towards the Kurds?"

Let’s leave aside the (juicy, but fundamentally dishonest) example of the Scottish independence; the Scots were offered a referendum and a majority of the Scots themselves chose (at least at the time) the current situation (extensive autonomy within a federative state), rather than full independence.  This is not a denial of self-determination – it’s an affirmation thereof.

Let’s also summarily dismiss the Druze case: Druze do not ask for an independent state of their own – not in Israel and not in Lebanon or Syria, in which there are even larger Druze communities.  Indeed, I have been told (by just one Druze man, so I cannot vouch for the statement) that the Druze religion expressly prohibits its adherents from seeking political (as opposed to religious and cultural) independence.

It is, nevertheless, true that many national groups are still denied a state of their own, despite aspiring to one.  It is no less true that ‘not supporting’ such national aspirations is different from actively opposing them; and ‘not supporting’ aspirations to a future nation state is very different from dismantling an existing one.  And, in any case, two wrongs don't make a right: true, the Kurds – because of unprincipled and self-serving attitudes by the 'international community' – still don't have a state of their own; but how does that justify taking from the Jews a state they have already achieved?

Says Mehdi Hasan, in an attempt to defuse some obvious objections:

“The issue is not whether Jews deserve a homeland or have a historic connection to the land of Palestine -- of course they do -- the issue is whether those historic and religious claims justify creating and expanding a Jewish majority state…"

To put it bluntly, this constitutes speaking with a forked tongue: Hasan manages to affirm in the same sentence that the Jews “of course” deserve a homeland and have a historic connection to the land of Palestine, but also that these are “historic and religious claims”.  The former part of the sentence appears to recognise certain rights; the latter relegates them to doubtful, uncertain claims.  Which is it?

As for the Jewish majority state, Mehdi Hasan is not required to help with (or even approve of) “creating and expanding” it.  It is already created.  Nor is he opposed just to “expanding” it, but – as we have seen – to its very existence, irrespective of size and borders.

Next come the usual accusations.  Mehdi Hasan claims that in Israel

“one ethnic group is privileged over another while another group is permanently disenfranchised dispossessed and subjected to endless military occupation."

Beyond the obvious disagreement on facts (e.g. to what extent any ‘privileges’ awarded to Jews in Israel are unusual, unacceptable or fundamentally different from those awarded the majority population in other countries), I take issue with Hasan choosing to cavalierly ignore the small issue of a 100-year-old conflict.  A bitter series of wars and violent acts, accompanied by political, economic and cultural warfare, as well as continuous attempts to criminalise and deny Israel’s legitimacy.  A conflict that the Jews neither wanted nor initiated, but for which consequences Mehdi Hasan appears to make the Jewish state wholly and uniquely responsible.

Is it really fair to – on one hand – affirm the right of Arabs (including Arab citizens of Israel) to express hostility and rejection to the very existence of the state of Israel and, at the same time, demand from the Jewish state to treat that Arab minority in the most egalitarian and enlightened way possible?  When, in the whole history of mankind, has a state been held to similar standards?

But even if we were to believe (ad absurdum) that Israel and only Israel is responsible for the current situation of inequality and “endless military occupation”, it does not follow that the ‘culprit state’ should be dismantled.  Which nation state has – in the whole history of mankind – been dismantled because it ‘misbehaved’?  Which nation state has been forced to become a bi-national or multi-national state?  Even the Germans did not forfeit their right to their own nation state, despite the German state perpetrating the most hideous crimes in history!

‘Anti-Zionists’ often cite the case of Apartheid South Africa.  But, even if (again ad absurdum) we ignore all the other many, huge and obvious differences, in South Africa whites have always been a minority (less than 20% in the 1960s, less than 8% nowadays); a minority, moreover, that had no “historic connection to the land”, a typical colonial settler population.

Perhaps feeling that he stepped on uncertain ground, Hasan quickly returned to ‘demonstrating’ that the motion was unreasonable.  This time, by claiming that it would force the Palestinian themselves to embrace Zionism.  Voting in favour of the motion, he said

“means to say to that oppressed group the Palestinian people to say to them that you're either a Zionist you either subscribe to the ideology of your oppressor or you're a racist.  What kind of choice is that?"

Just in case anyone missed it, Hasan drove the point home once more during the Q & A session:

“If you vote for the motion tonight you're saying […] we all have to be Zionists otherwise we're racists, we’re bigots, we’re antisemites.  Which, look, wouldn't be the end of the world for me: fine, I'll be a Zionist if you want me to be a Zionist I mean I once almost voted Lib Dem I'm okay with labels – but to ask the Palestinians to not just accept their dispossession, their ethnic cleansing, their ongoing occupation, but to also call themselves Zionists or else… is outrageous, you can't ask Palestinians to be Zionists you just can't, and by the way if they say it's racist to oppose Zionism well it's racist to ask Palestinians not to oppose their own occupiers…"

This is, of course, just another wild spin: the choice is by no means binary.  One is not required to be either a Zionist or an ‘anti-Zionist’ – in fact most people are neither; the Palestinians are not required to support or love the State of Israel – they’re not even required to stop opposing its actions or its policies.  They are required – not by the motion proposed at a random ‘debate’ in London, but by sheer intellectual honesty – to admit that the Jews possess the same right they demand for themselves: the right to an independent nation state of their own.  Such admission would not make the Palestinians Zionists and would not prevent them from protesting or opposing the Israeli actions; but it would indeed take them out of the ranks of ‘anti-Zionists’.  Demanding such admission is not outrageous – it is logical and necessary if peace is to be made.  Most conflicts in mankind’s recent history were not over the actual existence of states – they were conflicts over borders and resources.  Which made them more amenable to resolution by concession and accommodation.

One more – not very sophisticated, but highly effective – parable, oft-used by ‘anti-Zionists’ and recited at the debate by Ilan Pappé:

“The idea that the land of Palestine is the land of Israel always when you hear it think about someone coming to you in the dead of night in London and tells you I used to live in your house 2000 years ago and because of that the house belongs to me and the next day they come with the police who says ‘they have a right, you have to give them half of their house’.”

Except that Pappé’s ‘house in London’ parable strays away from the facts of the real story in too many ‘subtle’ ways and hence cannot in any way serve as a guide to the rights and wrongs of the situation.

Here’s a more honest (if longer) parable:
My maternal grandmother was born somewhere in Eastern Europe.  Her family owned a house there.  They were all killed or made refugees in the Holocaust.  I am what’s left – and I grew up listening to my grandma’s stories, longing, dreaming, praying to be able to live in my ancestral family home.  For many years, I couldn’t: the road was long and dangerous and my persecutors wouldn’t allow it.  One day, I was finally able to go there, to reclaim my inheritance.  That’s how I found out that, as soon as my family was killed and chased away, some Polish neighbours moved in.  As the borders changed, they were also thrown out and Russians moved in their stead.  Next, there were Latvians and finally Ukrainians…  By the time I got there, a few generations of Ukrainians had lived in the house.  The people I found there thought of it as their own home; I thought of it as mine.  Someone said that the only just solution would be to partition the house into two smaller apartments.  My heart ached, but I agreed – at least this way I’d have some of my family home – and a roof over my head.  But the Ukrainians wouldn’t even hear about it and they tried to kick me out…

The Q & A session consisted of just a few questions.  Some were obvious, one or two were stupid.
Somebody asked the ‘anti-Zionists’:

“Why is Israel singled out as a human rights violator – in the United Nations, by the Labour Party, by many other entities— as compared to so many egregious violators of human rights including in the Middle East why is it consistently singled out is that not a form of anti-semitism?"

Mehdi Hasan ‘responded’ to this question by promising to challenge its premise. then he pointed out that, in a previous ‘Inteligence squared’ debate, he had harshly criticised the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  So no 'singling out', he claimed.

Of course, the premise of the question was not that Israel is singled out at the ‘Intelligence²’ debates, but “in the United Nations, by the Labour Party, by many other entities”.  Hasan did not challenge that premise, because it is very difficult to challenge it: for instance, Israel is the only country in the world for which the UN Human Rights Council maintains a permanent agenda item (‘permanent’ meaning that it has to be discussed at every session).  This ensures that resolutions condemning Israel are adopted each time the Council convenes.  In contrast, Saudi Arabia is a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council, alongside other human rights stalwarts like China, Iraq, Egypt, Rwanda and Cuba.

At the debate, unfortunately, nobody pointed this out.  Or the obvious fact that no one (or, at least, no one of any consequence) talks about ‘anti-Saudism’ or even ‘anti-Wahabbism’.  The likes of Jeremy Corbyn, Ilan Pappé and Mehdi Hasan may well be using Saudi petrol to drive to ‘Boycott Israel’ demonstrations.

Perhaps the best question was one which was nearly laughed down by an already impatient audience:

“My question is why are we… this is almost masturbatory… you should pardon the expression… what is the solution… we're all thinking, kind people… what is the solution?"

It was asked in a soft voice, with apparent British courtesy – which is perhaps why none of the speakers realised that they have just been called ‘wankers’.  (As if to prove the point, none of them really attempted an honest answer, preferring instead to use the floor to try and score some extra points.)

Jokes aside, I can fully understand why the lady who asked that question referred to the ‘debate’ as masturbatory.  Masturbation may earn us some selfish pleasure – but it doesn’t create anything.  No baby was ever conceived by masturbating.  And that’s what the speakers did: they practised a form of intellectual wanking – Mehdi Hasan more than all the others.

 * * *

Mehdi Hasan won the debate.  But it is a Pyrrhic victory.  It doesn’t help the Palestinians; it doesn’t help anyone.  The entire debate can (and should) be filed under ‘more of the same’: more oil on the fire; more on how not to change anything.  More incrimination that attracts recrimination, that generates counter-recrimination…

82 years ago, when the conflict was still young, the Peel Commission diagnosed it as “fundamentally a conflict of right with right”.  My parable supports that view.

Ilan Pappé’s parable is just more intellectual masturbation – pleasurable for him no doubt, but utterly sterile.  My parable is an invitation to make love and create life.  Perhaps it’s naïve, perhaps clumsy – but at least I’m trying to do it with a partner…

Israel’s Nation State Law: drink driving vs. sober analysis

Recently, the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) has adopted a piece of legislation entitled ‘Basic Law: Israel – the Nation State of the Jewish People’.  Pretty much everything that happens in Israel can be described as ‘controversial’ if one follows traditional news outlets (let alone the social media).  But this new law is certainly even more ‘controversial’ than usual.  It has been criticised by many in Israel and by most Jewish organisations in the Diaspora.  Others, of course, have defended it.

There are three main ‘strains’ of criticism: the first basically accuses the Israeli legislators of unnecessarily ‘rocking the boat’.  Indeed, despite the brouhaha, the new law does not ‘do’ anything; it has no practical effect, it does not change the reality on the ground one iota.

A second type of criticism is that the law is poorly designed and drafted: it includes superfluous articles, while leaving out important principles.

I confess that I feel a lot of sympathy towards both these criticisms.  But then there is a third category – those who claim that the law is terribly wrong, even utterly evil.  The degree of ‘wrong’ varies between ‘incompatible with democratic principles’ and ‘profoundly racist’ – depending mainly on the critic’s own ideological inclinations.

Confronted with this new development in Israel, most commentators did what they always do – they quoted other pundits.  I’m otherwise inclined – rather than playing the pointless ‘X said/Y said’ game, I suggest taking a look at the actual text and analysing it, article by article.  Tedious – I know; but also meaningful.  Those who have no patience for such things are invited to let journalists tell them what they should see and think.

If you are still with me, let’s see what we have:

1a. The Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established.

This is only controversial among Israel’s enemies.  It’s also hardly new: Israel’s Declaration of Independence famously stated:

The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

 The League of Nations Mandate also declared

[R]ecognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country;

Let’s move on:

1b. The State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people, in which it fulfils its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.

This is nothing else than ‘Zionism in a nutshell’.

The next article is much more controversial:

1c. The right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.

I’ve heard a lot of criticism that points (without actually quoting it) to this particular article.  What I haven’t heard is a counter-proposal.  If we’re not saying that, what are we saying?

Are we saying that the Palestinian people also “has the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel”?  One can say that, if one is so disposed – but one cannot say that and militate for the two-state solution.  If the Palestinian people can exercise self-determination in Israel, then what’s the point of a Palestinian state?

Are we then saying that anyone who’s an Israeli citizen “has the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel”?  Again, one can say that – but how then is Israel “the national home of the Jewish people”?  How does one justify the Law of Return, which gives any member of the Jewish people (but not to non-Jews) the almost unconditional right to become an Israeli citizen?  How does one justify the Jewish character of the state – the flag, the symbols, the holidays, etc.?

Let me quote again from the League of Nations Mandate:

the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

It seems rather obvious: the League recognises that the ‘national rights’ belong to the Jewish people; when it comes to “the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, it sees only “civil and religious [but not national]rights”.

This is further strengthened in Article 4 of the Mandate:

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.

… and Article 7:

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

No equivalent provisions were envisaged for the non-Jewish communities.

Nor was that view abandoned with the dissolution of the League of Nations and its replacement by the United Nations.  UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II)/29 Nov. 1948 called for the establishment of two states and it referred to them as “the Jewish state” and “the Arab state” – although both states were to include minorities belonging to the other ethnicity.  In each state, the Resolution called for:

Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

Again, the reference is to “civil, political, economic and religious [rights] […] and fundamental freedoms”, but not to ‘national rights’, or ‘national self-determination’.  To the authors of the Resolution, it seemed obvious that the ‘national’ rights in the Jewish state belonged to Jews – why else would they define it as “the Jewish state”?

Finally, Israel’s Declaration of Independence proclaimed

the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

The Declaration also states:

The State of Israel […] will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture;

Just like the previous documents, the Declaration differentiates between on one hand ‘national rights’ (which it assigns to the Jewish people); and on the other hand other individual and collective rights, as well as basic freedoms, which are to be enjoyed by all inhabitants of the State, without discrimination.

Still, to people coming from a certain ideological environment, all this does not sound right.  In a recent Jewish Chronicle article, Jonathan Freedland fulminates:

Israel has explicitly granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another.

The article implies that this is inherently racist; it even hints that Israel may now be accused of apartheid – with more justification than before.  The author then goes on to claim that Israel is no longer a democratic country:

Those used to shouting that ‘Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East’ will need to find another slogan — because this is not how democracies behave.

Except that Freedland’s own country recognises Christmas and Easter as official state holidays (‘bank’ holidays).  Neither Rosh Hashanah, nor Eid-El-Fittr (or indeed Diwali, the Chinese New Year, etc.) enjoy that status.  The Christian cross (but not the Star of David or the Islamic Crescent) features on the national flag.   The Church of England is UK’s Established Church and no other faith has that status; the Head of State is also the Head of the Church, etc.  It would seem that – on some level at least – the UK has “granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another.”

UK does not have a constitution, so that ‘granting’ is done in practice.  But other countries do it explicitly – in fact at least as explicitly as Israel did.

Let’s have a look, for instance, at the Slovak Constitution.  Its Preamble proclaims:

We, the Slovak nation, mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for national existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire, proceeding from the natural right of nations to self-determination, together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with other democratic states, seeking the application of the democratic form of government and the guarantees of a free life and the development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity, that is, we, citizens of the Slovak Republic, adopt through our representatives the following Constitution.

Note that the Preamble postulates a “Slovak nation” acting “together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups”.  The term “together with”unites, but also divides.  It clearly says that “members of national minorities and ethnic groups” are not part of the “the Slovak nation”, though they arepart of the citizenry of the Slovak Republic.  In fact, the Preamble establishes two kinds of “we” – two collectives:

• “We, the Slovak nation”, and
• “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”.

The equation it draws is: “We, the Slovak nation” + “national minorities and ethnic groups” = “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”

How is this fundamentally different from ‘Jewish people’ and ‘Israeli citizens’?

Crucially, the Slovak Constitution talks about “the natural right of nations to self-determination” – a discussion included in the “Slovak nation” term of the equation and not in the ‘minorities/citizenry’ one.

This is not mere semantics.  Slovakia is home (but obviously not ‘national home’) to a sizable – circa 10% –  ethnic Magyar (Hungarian) minority, which has lived in the country for many centuries.

Demographics of Slovakia: the yellow areas have majority Magyar population.

Yet the Preamble to the Slovak Constitution is designed in ethnic terms.  References to “the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” are no doubt very meaningful to the (West-Slavic) “Slovak nation”; but the (non-Slavic) Magyar minority may find it hard to identify with such symbols of Slavic character.  In fact, they may be decidedly underwhelmed by “the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” (830-907 CE) and prefer to remember the Kingdom of Hungary, which – from circa 1000 CE until after World War I – included the territory of modern-day Slovakia.

The Slovak Constitution is not some outdated document, preserved merely by tradition: it was adopted in 1992.

Has Jonathan Freedland read the Slovak Constitution?  Would he say that it “has explicitly granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another”?  Would he say that it justifies claims of ‘apartheid’?

Yet Slovakia acceded to the European Union in 2004.  The accession process involves punctilious verification that the country fulfils the Accession Criteria, the first of which is:

political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

The European Union has judged Slovakia (with the Constitution I quoted from above) to fulfil the criterion above.

But let us return to the Israeli Nation State Law.  Paragraph 3 says:

3. The capital of the state: Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.

In the case of Israel (and only in the case of Israel!) this is seen by many as controversial.  But it isn’t new: it is nothing but ‘copy and paste’ from another Israeli law – ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel’, adopted in 1980!  Paragraph 1 of that law states:

Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.

Another controversial provision of the Nation Law states:

4a. The state’s language is Hebrew.

4b. The Arabic language has a special status in the state; Regulating the use of Arabic in state institutions or by them will be set in law.

4c. This clause does not harm the status given to the Arabic language before this law came into effect.

The BBC claims that the

so-called Jewish nation state bill […] downgrades Arabic from official language status

Except that Arabic has never been an official language in the State of Israel.  It has been (along with Hebrew and English) an official language in the British Mandate of Palestine.  While the State of Israel never declared Arabic (or English) an official language, it did enshrine in its laws and regulations the obligation of state institutions to provide services in Arabic, as well as Hebrew.  Articles 4b and 4c of the new law in effect guarantee the continuation of that obligation.

But is that (to borrow Jonathan Freedland’s expression) “how democracies behave”?  Let’s start with Jonny’s own country: it may surprise him to learn that the official language of the United Kingdom is English and… English.  Of course, the UK government provides services in Welsh (and occasionally in Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Bengali, etc.) – but these are not official languages in the UK.

The official language of Sweden is Swedish, notwithstanding the fact that a sizable proportion of Sweden’s population has Finnish as their mother tongue.

When it comes to language, Slovakia is infinitely harsher than Israel: a 2009 amendment to the ‘Language Law’ not only establishes Slovak as the only ‘state language’ throughout the country’s territory, but severely restricts the use of Hungarian – even among ethnic Magyars.

According to EU Observer:

The Law […] seeks to regulate any and all meetings, gatherings, associations and other forms of communication by insisting on the parallel use of the ‘state language’, Slovak, whenever and wherever members of the minority get together in public, and ‘public’ is very broadly defined. Thus, if a group of Hungarian-speakers establish a literary circle, say, their proceedings would have to have a parallel Slovak translation, whether anyone actually needed this or not.  Minority-language schools are obliged to run their administration and documentation in Slovak and the same applies to the health service. The armed forces, the police and the fire service are to be monolingually Slovak. This last, by way of example, creates interesting scenarios – thus in a Hungarian-speaking area, the firemen are very likely to be all Hungarian-speakers, but when putting out a fire, they must speak Slovak to each other and also, of course, to the owner of the house where the fire is.

Violating the Slovak Language Law is punishable by a fine of EUR 5,000 (equivalent to 5-6 months’ average wages in Slovakia).

But let’s go back to Israel’s newly adopted Nation State Law:

2a. The name of the state is ‘Israel.’

2b. The state flag is white with two blue stripes near the edges and a blue Star of David in the center.

2c. The state emblem is a seven-branched menorah with olive leaves on both sides and the word “Israel” beneath it.

2d. The state anthem is “Hatikvah.”

Details regarding state symbols will be determined by the law.

Jonathan Freedland might see these provisions as less controversial.  He would be wrong again, however.  It’s in the eye of the beholder, apparently.

Adalah is a foreign-funded Israeli Arab organisation which set as its mission

to promote human rights in Israel in general and the rights of the Palestinian minority, citizens of Israel, in particular.

Among other projects, Adalah compiled a database of Israeli ‘racist laws’ – laws that, in the organisation’s view, discriminate against the Arab minority.  This includes, for instance, the Flag and Emblem Law (adopted by the Knesset in 1949).  Adalah explains that the law

Adopts the flag of the First Zionist Congress and the Zionist Movement [which Adalah considers a colonial enterprise], a combination of a prayer shawl and the Shield of David, as the official flag of Israel.  The emblem of the State of Israel is a candelabrum, one of the symbols of the Temple era in Jewish history.

The Constitution of (EU member) Malta proclaims in Chapter 2: “The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. […] Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education.”

 Back to the Nation State Law:

5. Ingathering of the exiles: The state will be open for Jewish immigration and the ingathering of exiles

6. Connection to the Jewish people

6a. The state will strive to ensure the safety of the members of the Jewish people in trouble or in captivity due to the fact of their Jewishness or their citizenship.

6b. The state shall act within the Diaspora to strengthen the affinity between the state and members of the Jewish people.

6c. The state shall act to preserve the cultural, historical and religious heritage of the Jewish people among Jews in the Diaspora.

Jonathan Freedland appears to object less to these provisions.  Frankly, I can’t understand why.  If Israel is the embodiment of the Jewish right of self-determination, then they are easy to understand as expressions of that right; but if Israel embodies the right of self-determination of its Arab (or Palestinian Arab) citizens, then how does Freedland justify them?  Surely, that position should imply that Israel is obligated to rise to the defence of Palestinian besieged in the Yarmouk refugee camp – just as it would do if Yarmouk’s inhabitants were Jewish?  And why should the state “be open for Jewish immigration”, but not for Palestinian Arab immigration (or indeed for the ‘return’ of Palestinian refugees and their descendants)?  Freedland’s (unstated, but implied) views necessarily lead to the position of Adalah, which postulates that Israel’s preferential immigration law is discriminatory and racist.

7. Jewish settlement: The state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.

Here, a tedious linguistic explanation is necessary: the English word 'settlement' is likely to be misinterpreted, because it’s been intensively used (and abused) in relation to Israeli towns and villages beyond the Green Line.  But that would be a mistranslation.  The Hebrew word for ‘settling beyond the Green Line’ is ‘hitnahalut’.  But the law talks about “hityiashvut” – which is the word used for Jewish settlement before the establishment of the State (the term Yishuv – used to refer to the Jewish community in the British Mandate of Palestine – comes from the same root).  So no – this has nothing to do with the ‘illegal settlements’.

In fact, this paragraph of the law mimics the language of the League of Nations mandate, which called on the Administration of Palestine to “encourage […] close settlement by Jews on the land”.

Back to the Nation Law again:

8. Official calendar: The Hebrew calendar is the official calendar of the state and alongside it the Gregorian calendar will be used as an official calendar. Use of the Hebrew calendar and the Gregorian calendar will be determined by law.

9. Independence Day and memorial days

9a. Independence Day is the official national holiday of the state.

9b. Memorial Day for the Fallen in Israel’s Wars and Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day are official memorial days of the State.

10. Days of rest and Sabbath: The Sabbath and the festivals of Israel are the established days of rest in the state; Non-Jews have a right to maintain days of rest on their Sabbaths and festivals; Details of this issue will be determined by law.

These paragraphs sketch the Jewish character of the state.  Once more, they might look less controversial to Jonathan Freedland – but these aspects are listed in Adalah’s database of ‘discriminatory laws in Israel’.

The national anthem of Cyprus praises the “Greeks of old”. Which might not impress the country’s ethnic Turkish citizens. 

Finally:

11. Immutability: This Basic Law shall not be amended, unless by another Basic Law passed by a majority of Knesset members.

Which says that the Nation State Law can only be amended by another Basic Law – and not by ‘just any old law’.

***

When all is said and done, the crux of the matter remains paragraph 1c, which makes “national self-determination in the State of Israel” a unique prerogative of the Jewish people.

Jonathan Freedland believes that this is inherently undemocratic and racist; that it turns Arab Israelis into ‘second-class citizens’.

As I’ve shown, if this is true of Arab Israelis, it is also true of Slovak Magyars and other minorities.  But is it?  Well, it depends on the ideology one chooses to subscribe to.  More precisely, it depends on where one chooses to position oneself on the universalism-vs.-particularism scale (I’ve touched briefly on this subject here).

For extreme universalists, states (viewed at best as a temporary and necessary evil) exist as artificial constructs, aimed at placing barriers between people.  For extreme particularists, they are exclusive ethnic fortresses, to be fiercely defended against any foreign trespassers.  In-between, however, there is a wide range of legitimate opinions.

Sadly, in Jonathan Freedland’s world, there is but one ‘good’ opinion (indeed, just one legitimate world view) – the one he subscribes to.  Anyone who dares disagree is automatically placed outside what David Hirsch calls ‘the community of the Good’; s/he is racist, undemocratic, etc.  Well, I’m afraid, Jonny dear, that this in itself smacks of intolerance and bigotry.

I resent ethnic exclusivism and despise ethnic supremacism; but I also view the state as repository of a people’s historical and cultural heritage, a ‘safe space’ for a particular flavour of humanity to develop and grow.  Complemented and enriched by others – yes; overwhelmed by others – no.

In its most profound sense, ‘national self-determination’ means the right of a people to impart to their state its distinct, unique, ‘national’ character.  It’s about flavour and texture Jonny – not power and subjugation.

I strongly believe that Arab Israelis should have equal political, civil, economic and social rights, as well as personal and collective freedoms.  They should be free to use their own language, to develop, enjoy and pass on to future generations their own culture.  Israel is their home – in every sense but one.  Physically, politically, legally, economically and socially Arab Israelis fully ‘belong’ in the State of Israel – just like Slovak Magyars ‘belong’ in Slovakia.  But we also need to understand that Arab Israelis will always look to the Arab world (and – one day if they so desire – to a Palestinian Arab state) as their cultural and ‘national’ home.  Just like Slovak Magyars will look to Hungary; just like Swedish Finns look to Finland; and – dare I say – just like British Jews look to Israel.  There is nothing wrong with that; nothing untoward or illegitimate.  That makes them neither a ‘fifth column’, nor ‘second class citizens’.

These are my views.  Jonathan Freeland is, of course, welcome to his opinions – as long as they are logical and consistent.  But there is a huge internal contradiction in his world view: even while railing against Israel’s Nation Law, Mr. Freedland is asking the UK Labour Party to adopt in full the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism.  Jonathan objects to the fact that Labour has excluded from their Code of Conduct some of the examples of antisemitism – including

Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavo[u]r.

But if Jonathan claims that the right of self-determination of Palestinian citizens of Israel should be satisfied in Israel, then it follows that the right of self-determination of British Jews should be satisfied in Britain (and that of Russian Jews in Russia, etc.)  How, then, does Jonathan Freedland justify his other claim, that the right of self-determination of Jews is embodied by the State of Israel and that denying that right (i.e. denying Israel’s right to exist as the State of the Jews) is an antisemitic prejudice?  And how does he justify his demand for a separate Palestinian state?

Ideology is like alcohol: it affects people’s ability to think straight and constrains their peripheral vision.  One should neither drive a car, nor write a political article while ‘under the influence’!