Showing posts with label Arab Israelis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab Israelis. Show all posts

Sunday, 6 November 2022

Israel elections 2022: what the Diaspora should know

Israel’s latest elections appear to have broken the prolonged stalemate between the two ‘blocs’.  I don’t mean ‘left’ and ‘right’ – terms that make very little sense in the current Israeli political context; I don’t even mean ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’; no, I mean the anti-Netanyahu and pro-Netanyahu camps – that’s the only accurate way to describe the two political tendencies that participated in the latest electoral contest.  Were it not for Netanyahu and his legal ‘tzores’, Israel would have had a stable government, without the need for those unprecedented five national elections between April 2019 and November 2022.

While there’s many a slip twixt election results and a coalition government, the victory certainly belongs to the pro-Netanyahu bloc, which garnered 64 seats of the 120 available in Israel’s unicameral parliament – the Knesset.  The anti-Netanyahu bloc won only 51 seats, with the remainder of 5 occupied by the majority-Arab Hadash-Ta’al party – which adopted its usual ‘plague-on-both-their-houses’ strategy (read: they ruled out joining any governing coalition with ‘the Zionists’).

Most Israelis were not surprised; but the results sent a huge tremor in the ranks of the self-described ‘progressives’.  And not just because they signalled the almost complete demise of what some insist on calling ‘the Israeli left’ (that is, Meretz and the Labour Party); but even more so, because of the rise of Religious Zionism, the ‘far-right’ or ‘hawkish’ alliance.

Fair disclosure

Had I participated in these elections, my vote would have gone to National Unity – Benny Gantz’s party.  No, not because of the (rather naff) name; nor because I like its leader – though I think he is a decent guy.  Finally, not because I don’t like Netanyahu.  Though I’ve never been a great supporter, I do think that Netanyahu has, by and large, been a good leader.  Even his most bitter adversaries cannot deny that he has presided over a period of economic growth and prosperity; that he has pursued Israel’s vital interests without engaging in adventurous military conflicts in places like Syria and Lebanon – let alone Iran; that he has somehow managed to expand Israel’s diplomatic reach beyond what many thought possible.  His adversaries will attribute those achievements to luck or circumstance; but if one manages to stay lucky for 12 straight years as Prime Minister of Israel – I for one will nevertheless applaud!

True, Netanyahu hasn’t made peace with the Palestinians.  But if this is the only measure of success, then all Israeli leaders have been failures – so why single out Netanyahu?

Many accuse Netanyahu of dishonesty.  It is true that, in his political dealings, he often broke promises and told lies.  But politics is not a business for the faint-hearted; and if we were to crucify all disingenuous politicians – there’d be a lot of hammering in the great halls of many a parliament.  As for his purported corruption – that must be assessed in a court of law; and that’s all I have to say about it.

So if Netanyahu is such a great guy – you ask – why would you not vote for him?  Well, mainly because he has been in power too long.  Israel needs some new blood at the helm; and she isn’t getting it, because nothing grows well in the shadow of a big tree.  And yes, also because, in his quest for power, Netanyahu has now made some unsavoury alliances.  For all those reasons, Israel must – sooner or later – wean herself from Netanyahu, just as she did in the past from Ben Gurion.

Still, I am not particularly worried about Netanyahu winning again: he is 73 and – unless he has the grace to draw a line himself at a propitious time – nature and a few political vultures will at some point do it for him.

As for the ‘Religious Zionism’ extremists, I have nothing but contempt for them: their way isn’t my way and their Zionism is a very far cry from mine.

Still, I don’t share the ‘gewalt’ atmosphere that some (especially in the Diaspora) dishonestly create around these elections, and that others naively ingurgitate – hook, sink and proverbial liner.

A bit of history

For many, the major ‘item’ in these elections is the meteoric rise of Religious Zionism: led by the ‘far-right enfant terrible’ Bezalel Smotrich and including Itamar Ben Gvir – an extremist and former disciple of Meir Kahane – Religious Zionism more than doubled its parliamentary footprint; it won 14 out of the 120 Knesset seats, becoming the 3rd largest political group.

It is worth examining the history of this party: its first embodiment was T’kuma (Revival), a small splinter of the National Religious Party (known in Israel mostly by its Hebrew acronym – Mafdal).  The latter was formed as early as 1956 and initially leaned left, operating its own trade union and cooperating in coalition governments with the Labour Party.  It increasingly turned right, mainly in reaction to what it perceived as the Labour’s neglect and lack of interest in Jewish faith and tradition.  The founders of T’kuma left Mafdal in 1998, over its perceived ‘softness’.  Between 1999 and 2013 it survived by forming, breaking and reforming alliances with other small parties on the ‘right’ fringe of Israeli politics.  Bereft of real power and influence, the leaders of T’kuma were reduced to attempting to gain some measure of notoriety through political stunts and outrageous statements.  They featured often in the reports of foreign journalists intent on showing extremism in Israel; but most Israelis dismissed them as irrelevant, big-mouth non-entities.

In 2014, the Knesset approved a bill which increased the threshold for entering the parliament from 2% to 3.25% of the votes – meaning that the smallest possible political group represented in the Knesset was 4 members.

The brilliant Israeli political analyst Haviv Rettig Gur described the move:

"The reform passed in the Knesset relatively easily. Its purpose, as articulated by the bill’s sponsors at the time, was to reduce the government’s dependence on tiny, marginal factions and thus increase stability and governability.

There are too many parties jostling around in the Knesset, went the argument. Prime ministers must satisfy as many as half a dozen – in the case of the outgoing government, eight! – separate factions to keep the government alive. A dozen factions might negotiate over any piece of legislation. This complexity and dependence on small parties warped decision-making and was a major source of political instability. Simple governance had been rendered nigh impossible by the sheer messiness of it all."

 At the time, most Israeli political analysts either applauded the move as ‘a step in the right direction’ or dismissed it as cosmetic tinkering, demanding more radical changes.

It was opposed, of course, by the small parties that were likely to be left out of the parliament.

The Arab parties saw the move as directed against them – as they tended to win between 2% and 4% of the votes; they lost no time in calling it yet another ‘racist’ measure aimed at denying Arab Israelis their political rights.  But the increase in threshold was seen as affecting the Jewish far-right even more – those small parties generally won below 3%.  Hence, T’kuma and others on the fringe right called it ‘anti-democratic’ at the time.

The prospect of getting rid of the small far-right parties (and, possibly, to attract more votes from the Arab sector) caused many ‘progresives’ to support the bill.

Haviv Rettig Gur reminds us:

"President Isaac Herzog, then a senior Labor party lawmaker, had proposed an even steeper increase to 5% a few years earlier."

 The increase in parliamentary threshold from 2% to 3.25% should forever be studied as a textbook example of how the Law of Unintended Consequences works in politics.

In the years to come, some of the measure’s fiercest critics were to benefit from it – while some of its supporters would suffer.

The 3.25% hurdle would force more of the small parties to merge or at least form temporary, pre-election alliances.  Thus, the Arab parties (who had so vehemently denounced the higher threshold) formed the ‘Joint List’ – which won 13 seats in September 2019 and 15 in March 2020, becoming Israel’s 3rd largest party.  Conversely, in 2022 the Jewish left (which had mostly supported the bill) failed to unite, which left the hard-left (Meretz) out in the rain, while the more moderate Labour narrowly scraped in, with just 3.69% of the vote.

Ever the wily political operator, Netanyahu understood the significance of the increased threshold: since parties gaining less than 3.25% would not get any seats in the Knesset, fragmentation in the ‘pro-Netanyahu’ camp risked wasting votes and thus pushing his putative coalition below the minimum required majority of 61 in the 120-large parliament.

In 2021, he engineered an alliance between T’kuma (which had meanwhile been renamed ‘National Union’ and was already led by Bezalel Smotrich) and two other tiny parties: Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength) and the anti-gay No’am.  Netanyahu assessed (correctly, most analysts would say) that in the absence of such a pact both Otzma Yehudit and No’am would fail to pass the electoral threshold, thus wasting votes for his camp.  Otzma Yehudit was generally seen as the weaker partner in the alliance, which is why Ben Gvir was placed not on the second place (after Smotrich), but only on the third.

As it happened, the new alliances (dubbed ‘Religious Zionism’) won only some 5% of the votes, resulting in 6 Knesset seats.  As we know, Netanyahu failed to cobble together a coalition, while his opponents from hard-right to hard-left) managed to rise above their huge ideological differences and form a – however feeble – governing coalition.

From irrelevance to ‘victory’

So what caused Religious Zionism to more than double its electoral strength between March 2021 and November 2022 – from 5.12% to 10.83% of the votes, or from 6 to 14 mandates?  It was certainly not its legislative achievements: the party was in opposition and (apart from fiery speeches and annoying stunts) contributed absolutely nothing.

Some – both in Israel and abroad – are eager to ‘explain’ the party’s success so as to show Israelis in the worst possible light.

Esawi Frej (an Arab Israeli politician representing the hard-left Meretz party in the Knesset and Minister of Regional Cooperation in the outgoing government) tweeted:

"14 mandates to Ben Gvir is 14 mandates to hatred of Arabs. The 3rd largest party is racist, Kahanist, violent… it doesn’t want me or my children here. It’s no longer a slippery slope. It’s the abyss itself."

Frej’s post was written in Hebrew, but the text was translated and gleefully re-tweeted in English by Yachad, a self-described ‘progressive’ British Jewish outfit whose raison d’être is ‘criticising’ Israel.

But why would ‘hatred of Arabs’ (assuming that’s what impelled people to vote for Religious Zionism) rise from 5% to almost 11% of the population in just a few months?  And how is ‘hatred of Arabs’ consistent with the quasi-general support for the Abraham Accords, including masses of Israelis eager to visit and do business with some of the newly-accessible Arab countries?

In reality (as I’m sure both Esawi Frej and Yachad know, but choose not to say), the rise of Religious Zionism is the result of a ‘perfect storm’, consisting mainly of two factors.

Firstly, in May 2021 Israelis experienced yet another mini-war with Gaza.  Denied participation in the Palestinian elections (it was widely expected to win them, which is why Palestinian Authority President and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas ‘postponed them sine die), Hamas decided to bolster its credentials as ‘the’ defender of Palestinians by launching a rocket assault on Israel.  This in itself would not have been so traumatic: it happened quite a few times before.

But something completely new happened this time: massive riots by Arab citizens of Israel, randomly targeting Jews and Jewish property.  The riots were particularly violent in the ‘mixed towns’ (i.e. places where Jews and Arabs live together, such as Lod, Ramle and Acco).  In those places, the riots resembled pogroms, with bands of young Arabs attacking passing Jews (two were killed and several others injured), throwing rocks at cars and setting fire to Jewish houses, cars and synagogues.  What’s more, many testified that some local Arab citizens, while not participating themselves in the violence, pointed out Jewish homes and cars to the rioters, who proceeded to attack or burn them.  The Arab riots (and the Jewish ‘counter-riots’ that soon followed) continued for a whole week, forcing the government to impose a state of emergency.

To complete the grim ‘score line’ of this episode of violence: the Arab rioters set 112 Jewish homes, 10 synagogues and 849 cars on fire (as well as an Arab house, which they mistook for being inhabited by Jews).  386 Jewish homes were looted and another 673 damaged.  There were more than 5,000 recorded instances of stone-throwing against Jews.  On the Arab side, 13 homes and 13 cars were burned by rioting Jews and there were 41 recorded incidents of stone-throwing.

It is hard to exaggerate the traumatic effect of these riots.  Imagine cowering in your home with your family, while rioters are already burning houses and cars a few blocks away; imagine driving home from work one evening, your car pounded with large rocks from both sides of the road, while large mobs appear to be baying for your blood.  While only a small percentage of the Israeli population directly experienced the riots, practically all others watched them on television, or on videos circulating on social media.  Israelis have a keen sense of history and the images of Jews experiencing pogroms in their own country were devastating.

Timing is of the essence here, too: the riots started in the evening of 10 May 2021, almost at the same time as 150 rockets were launched from Gaza at random targets in Israel.  They continued while Israel was pounded with hundreds of additional missiles.

To make matters worse, once the riots died down, (on 18 May 2021) Arab Israeli politicians declared a general strike – in support of their ‘brothers’ in the West Bank and Gaza.  This may be a ‘symbolic’ act; but hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews saw their Arab colleagues refusing to come to work (in hospitals, schools, factories and offices), in the midst of a war, in ‘solidarity’ with the enemy.  The strike pulled the rug from under the feet of those (among them the Israeli left) who preached coexistence and insisted that the riots involved only an unrepresentative, violent minority.  Conversely, it bolstered the far-right propaganda, seemingly vindicating their portrayal of Arab Israelis as a ‘fifth column’ ready to act in concert with the country’s existential enemies.  There were Arab voices that publicly condemned the riots; but the general strike drowned them down or rendered them meaningless.

Many of the votes for Religious Zionism are, no doubt, a reaction to the May 2021 riots and to the general strike that followed.  But another factor contributed, as well.

Those who, like me, follow the meanders of Israeli politics would have noticed a significant absence in the 2022 elections: that of Yamina (Rightwards), the party led by Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked.  In the March 2021 elections, Yamina won 7 seats.  Although ideologically to the right of Netanyahu’s Likud, Yamina decided to side with the anti-Netanyahu bloc.  It thus enabled that bloc to form a wide governing coalition, including Labour, the hard-left Meretz and the Islamist Arab party Ra’am.  Naftali Bennett initially headed that coalition, as Prime Minister; he later kept his promise and stepped down to enable Yair Lapid (leader of the centrist Yesh Atid/There’s a Future) to assume the premiership, as part of a ‘rotation’ agreement.

But many in Yamina’s right-wing constituency took a dim view of this alignment with the left, seeing it as a ‘crossing of the lines’ and a betrayal of the mandate that the voters gave that party.  So strong was that backlash, that Bennett decided not to run in 2022.  His decision was vindicated when the party of his political partner Ayelet Shaked failed to even come close to the electoral threshold.

Betrayed once and not about to be fooled again, Yamina’s voters (typically religious people leaning right) looked around for a political home.  But, given that Netanyahu had orchestrated an alliance of the small right-wing parties, the pickings were slim.  Some no doubt chose to vote for the religious Mizrakhi Shas, which would explain that party’s rise from 9 seats in 2021 to 11 in 2022; but many more chose Religious Zionism – not necessarily because of its extremism, but because it was the only party left that represented the two aspects that ‘talked to’ these voters: religion and nationalism.

Esawi Frej is wrong – and he knows it: it is not ‘hatred of Arabs’ that propelled Religious Zionism to its apparent prominence.  Many of those who voted for this party did so not because of its extremism, but despite it – in reaction to events that that party neither triggered nor engineered – but simply profited from.

Of course, I’m no naïve: there is, unfortunately, little love lost (and quite a lot of rancour, actually) between Arabs and Jews in Israel.  Frej is no doubt right that Ben Gvir would rather he and his children did not live in Israel.  I suspect that Frej would also prefer ‘the Zionists’ not to have ‘settled’ in ‘Palestine’ in the first place.  Fortunately, neither Ben Gvir nor Frej has any choice in the matter: both communities are there to stay and must find a way to satisfy one’s aspirations without impinging too much on the other’s.

But while many Israeli Jews feel some degree of hostility, fear and mistrust towards their Arab countrymen – that isn’t (as the likes of Yachad want us to believe) ‘racism’.  It is not a conviction that Arabs are racially inferior that’s behind most Israeli Jews’ attitude.  Rather, this is the ‘normal’ resentment caused by 100 years of a conflict beseeched by existential threats and fears, by abominable acts of violence, by denial of humanity, aspirations and history and by outlandish accusations of ‘Nazism’ and ‘apartheid’.

That hostility is akin to the one felt by Brits towards Germans in World War I; not to that propagated by Nazis against Jews in World War II.  There’s an ocean of difference between the two; and those who try to merge them into one problem are either blatantly dishonest, or something is seriously wrong with their moral compass.

While not constituting ‘racism’ and while being understandable in the context of the conflict, the rancour between the two communities remains a bad thing.  We (Jews and Arabs) must strive to rise above it; we must fight those (from either side) who seek to exacerbate it.

I’m an optimist: given how deep, long and hurtful this conflict has been, the levels of hostility are actually surprisingly low.  It might be disturbing to see Arab rioters on the rampage in a Jewish neighbourhood – and Jews ‘responding’ with violence against other, uninvolved Arabs.  But, despite everything, the two communities soon returned to ‘normal’: working in the same hospitals, schools, factories and offices; interacting in a civil – if not very warm and cuddly – manner.  Compare that with what’s happened just a short distance away, in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria; or even in Egypt; and, in the past, in Jordan – and more recently in Iran…

Gewalt – racists on board!

Of course, that does not mean that Smotrich and (especially) Ben Gvir – and some of their supporters – aren’t racists.  I believe they are.  But they learned to dissimulate it, to moderate it just enough to allow them to squeeze below the standard of proof required by law.  Ben Gvir claims that he has no desire to expel Arabs for being Arabs, but only those who are ‘disloyal’ – meaning they engage in or support acts of violence or subversion against the state.  Personally, I doubt he is sincere about that; but in a democracy we cannot stop people from running because of what we suspect they actually think; but only because of what they say and do.  That’s why Ben Gvir (unlike his former mentor Kahane) was declared ‘kosher’ to run.  As the Israeli expression goes, he may be ‘kosher, but stinks’.

But, if this is the situation, should we not be terribly worried?  I mean, Ben Gvir may soon be Public Security Minister – in charge of the national police!

So maybe the likes of Yachad are right to ‘demand action’ from the Diaspora – to ‘save Israel from the Israelis’?  Maybe the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Jewish Leadership Council and other bombastically named Jewish ‘leadership’ bodies are right to express ‘grave concerns’?

Well, I think the Diaspora ‘armchair activists’ are all wrong.  I think they talk through their arses, have no genuine understanding of Israel, her history and her politics and, if anything, only do harm.

Some people have short memories: we’ve actually seen this film before.  When the tough-talking Menachem Begin became not just minister but Prime Minister, many warned of an impending catastrophe.  After all, Begin was a former leader of the Irgun – seen as a terrorist organisation in Britain and elsewhere. The same Irgun which perpetrated the bombing of the King David hotel (which, however, ‘happened’ to be the headquarter of the British Army); the organisation that captured two British sergeants and hanged them in retaliation to the hanging of its own captured operatives; the organisation that attacked Deir Yassin.

Begin had been a promoter of ‘Greater Israel’ – including not just the West Bank, but territories on the eastern side of the Jordan River, if and when they were captured (or ‘liberated’).  Yet Begin was the Prime Minister that relinquished 100% of the Sinai peninsula (which constituted some 70% of the territory under Israeli control) in return for a ‘cold peace’ with Egypt.  In the process, he even uprooted Jewish ‘settlers’ – something that ‘the experts’ assessed he’d never do.  Prime Minister Begin (for whom even uttering the term ‘Palestinian’ was anathema) became the first Israeli leader to accept the idea of ‘autonomy’ for the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza.

Some people never learn.  So, when Ariel Sharon became first Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister, we were treated to the same predictions of impending doom.  After all, as a military commander Sharon became famous for his ultra-aggressive actions – sometimes in open defiance of orders.  As a politician, he became a major promoter of settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza.  As Minister of Defence, he presided over the war in Lebanon, which ended with expelling the PLO ‘troops’ far from Israel’s borders – but also with the massacres at Sabra and Shatila.

Yet Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the Israeli leader who unilaterally withdrew from Gaza.  In the process, this ‘darling’ of the ‘settlement movement’ evacuated (forcibly when necessary) every Jewish ‘settler’ from that territory – and (as a sign of further intentions) also from 4 West Bank ‘settlements’.  The ‘extremist’ Ariel Sharon suffered a stroke and became permanently incapacitated before putting in practice his intentions to extricate Israel, one way or another, out of most of the West Bank.

There was also a certain Avigdor Lieberman.  He, too, had the reputation of being a ‘meshugener’ – an unreliable hothead.  Among other things, it was reported that he opined that, in the event of a war with Egypt, Israel should bomb the Aswan Dam.  No more and no less!  His intemperate outbursts directed at members of the Knesset from the Arab parties were (in)famous – and so were his threats directed at anyone who, in his view, incited terror against the State of Israel.  No wonder that his 2016 appointment as Minister of Defence caused trepidation.  Yet Avigdor Lieberman did not start wars and did not get involved in any military adventure.  In fact, his major contribution as Defence Minister was… coming down very assertively in favour of equal rights for LGBT soldiers.

In fact, Israel’s short modern history is replete with ‘colourful’ characters who talked wildly but acted with surprising restraint and prudence.  And on the few occasions that a real extremist came out of the woodwork – such as Meir Kahane in the 1980s – the Israeli political body spit it out.

“Hold on a minute” – I hear you say.  “Netanyahu needs Religious Zionism in order to form a coalition and, then, to remain in power.  They have him by the short and curlies!”

Well, it’s true – at least apparently.  Netanyahu seems intent on forming a coalition with Religious Zionism and the two Haredi parties – Shas and United Torah Judaism.  But ‘seems’ may be the operative word in the sentence above.  He may do what everybody expects him to do – or he may surprise us all.  After all – unlike after the previous four rounds of elections, he now has a clear path to majority.  That, paradoxically, may open a range of possibilities – and few are as adept at playing the political game as Bibi the Fox.

But, even if he does proceed along the obvious route to power, how likely is Netanyahu to – in practice – relinquish some of that power to the likes of Smotrich and Ben Gvir?  True, he needs them; but, in reality, no more than they need him.  They may be extremists – but stupid they’re not: when the inebriating fumes of victory disperse, they will realise (if they haven’t already) that their success is the result of a very peculiar set of circumstances, one very unlikely to occur again.  The next round of elections is likely to see them cut down to size again.  In particular if they are seen to have inflicted yet another round of elections on the people of Israel – after just a few months.  And you can bet your bottom shekel that Netanyahu will make sure they are seen in that light.

That there is no love lost between Netanyahu and either Smotrich or Ben Gvir is the world’s worst kept secret.  Netanyahu has stated in the past that Ben Gvir is not ministerial material.  And while, for obvious reasons, he has recently changed that particular tune, no one believes he also changed his mind; least of all Ben Gvir.  In the midst of the recent elections campaign, a recording surfaced – and the entire country could hear Smotrich disparaging Netanyahu in stark, even vulgar terms.  The entire country could hear – including of course Netanyahu himself.

In fact, Netanyahu has already started to put Religious Zionism in its place.  Several times during the campaign, he made it clear that the major ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence) will be under Likud’s control.  More recently – and in response to vague ‘plans’ by Religious Zionism to ban LGBT pride events – Netanyahu made it clear that his government will not allow any worsening in LGBT rights, including no limitations on pride parades.  The Israeli media referred to those signals coming from Netanyahu’s office as “slapping down [his] far-right partners”.

One does not win multiple elections in Israel without learning a trick or two.  If, drunk on their lucky electoral success, Ben Gvir and Smotrich pick a fight with Netanyahu… well, that conflict can only see one winner.  Netanyahu – who has seen off much worthier opponents – will chew them both for breakfast

Let’s not forget: Bezalel Smotrich has been a minister before – he held the Transport portfolio between June 2019 and May 2020.  But – whether he learned some restraint himself or whether because Netanyahu kept him on a short lead – his short stint as minister was utterly unremarkable.

But, let’s leave aside Netanyahu and his great talents or utter lack of scruples – choose one according to your inclination.  Let’s, instead, look at Israel’s track record.  In her 74 years of modern existence, the country has faced tremendous, unparalleled challenges – military, economical, political and social.

Haters will hate, Cassandras will forever prophesise impending doom, and for some people the glass is always half-empty.  But, despite all those challenges, Israel is today not just undefeated militarily, but economically successful, democratic and generally flourishing.  This young country is ranked 19th in the world by Human Development Index – on a par with mighty Japan and higher than France, Italy and Spain; 12th in the world by life expectancy – higher than Sweden, Norway, France and Canada (UK is 29th, USA 46th); the International Monetary Fund predicts that between 2021 and 2027 the Israeli economy will grow at an average annual rate of almost 4.5% – one of the highest in OECD.

Yet some in the Diaspora never seem to see this; or if they do see it, they don’t quite believe it; or if they do believe it – they see disaster looming just around the corner.  Why?  Is it really Israel’s fault?  Or is it the diaspora spirit – forever fearful, forever uncertain, forever plagued by guilt?


Not the rising antisemitism, nor the rampant assimilation...
Are these really "our worst fears"?

It’s time for this worried Diaspora to chill and learn a bit of optimism.  Why not start with that great Hebrew expression:

!יהיה בסדר (It’ll be fine!)

Have a little faith, folks!

Sunday, 10 May 2020

Taking the Mick out of Davis



If I were a rich man,
Yubby dibby dibby dibby dibby dibby dibby dum.
All day long I'd biddy biddy bum.
If I were a wealthy man.  […]
And it won't make one bit of difference if I answer right or wrong.
When you're rich, they think you really know!

An absolute giant of Yiddish literature, Sholem Aleichem populated his stories with all the colourful characters of the Eastern European shtetl.  And one of the most convincing is the ‘gvir’: the rich Jew; the parvenu, the village boss who mistakes subservience for respect and trades ‘charity’ for influence and power.

The Jewish shtetl is a thing of the (nostalgic) past; not so the gvir; that tragi-comic character, it seems, still struts around: among us, but not quite one of us.

*** 

Sir Mick Davis is a very rich man.  He made his money in mining (coal, metals, petroleum); but don’t picture him in a hard hat with black on his nose – I suspect that he mines primarily from the comfort of a well-upholstered, directorial armchair.  And I guess he’s put that money to good use: he is an important donor to the Conservative Party (Labour also likes money; but it doesn’t like Jews – let alone rich ones!)  Davis served as Treasurer and – until recently – Chief Executive of the Tory Party.

I know, I know… a miner called Davis… what a cliché!  But no: Sir Mick ‘the Miner’ isn’t Welsh – he’s Jewish.  So, naturally, he also took an interest in the affairs of British Jewry: in 2009, he became Chairman of the Jewish Leadership Council.  How, you’re asking?  Well… previously, the JLC had been led by an elected official: the President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.  It looks like Mr. Davis took advantage of a change of guard at the helm of the Board to shoulder aside the new President.  Or (to use the far more delicate language employed by the Jewish Chronicle)
he grasped the reins of its [the JLC’s] executive.
The newspaper commented – perhaps with a hint of irony – that this
may not have been exactly a palace coup but it showed who was boss in town.
Didn't it just!  I should warn you here: irony plays a big role in this story; where are you, Sholem Aleichem, when we most need you?

Mr. Davis first courted controversy in 2010, when he opined (in English and in public) that Israel ‘could become’ an apartheid state.  Some may see quite a bit of irony in that: Mick Davis was born and lived his formative years in Apartheid South Africa.  And… I might be wrong here, but I’ve never seen his name listed among the many South-African Jews who actively fought that appalling regime; unless, that is, one considers immigrating from South Africa to the UK as a brave act of social protest.  If indeed young Mr. Davis omitted to valiantly combat the apartheid in his home country, it must’ve been just a matter of  perspective: it seems it’s easier to recognise (and, consequently, criticise) potential apartheids that ‘may occur’ thousands of miles away; it’s not always easy to spot an actual apartheid operating under one’s very nose.

Mr. Davis’s comments on Israel’s putative apartheid-hood so outraged many in the British Jewish community that a petition was written demanding his resignation from public community positions.  But it was quickly withdrawn, when Sir Mick threatened to let the whole weight of his… err… indignation bear – by threatening to deploy his heavy legal artillery against the poor... err... much less indignant petitioner!  Not, God forbid, that Mr. Davis believes that freedom of speech is for him, but not for others; no, it’s just that, apparently, the petition had ‘misrepresented his positions’…

More recently, Sir Mick has once again become the talk of the (virtual) shtetl: in the cover-page article of the (almost bankrupted, but fortunately freshly resuscitated) Jewish News, he accused “Israeli politics” of “violat[ing] values of the Diaspora”.

I find the article full of (unintended) irony.  So let me read it to you with a running commentary.
Says Sir Mick:
Israel remains surrounded by hostility but its emerging existential threats come from within.
Now, when he’s right – he’s right: the Jewish state is indeed surrounded by enemies: there’s for instance Iran (80 times larger than Israel in area, 9 times in population, 5 times in economic output), whose Holocaust-denying leaders call for Israel’s blood every day – and twice on Saturday.  Leaving aside its nuclear ambitions, Iran has a large, strong and well-equipped military, which is currently busy entrenching itself in Syria, as close as it dares to Israel’s borders.  Another of those borders precariously separates Israel from an Iranian ally: Hezbollah – and its 100,000+ rockets.  To the south, there’s Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; i.e., tens of thousands of rockets and mortar rounds, some capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away.  In Sinai (a territory 3 times larger than Israel, which the Jewish state once controlled but ceded in return for peace and security) lurks a very active branch of the Islamic State.  You know – those nice people who’ve recently beheaded, crucified and burned a broad swath of blood and tears through Syria and Iraq.  And that’s before one thinks of threats that currently seem – for whatever that’s worth in the Middle East – less imminent: such as a certain manic dictator with neo-Ottoman ambitions.

Yet Sir Mick has decreed that these are not really existential threats.  ‘The problem’, he seems to preach to those Israelis who face the rockets, the bullets and the knives, ‘the problem is not that they want to kill you.  No, let me tell you what the real problem is: it’s your own suicidal tendencies!’ 

Now, Mick Davis is certainly entitled to his opinion.  It would be good to understand, however, on what specialist knowledge it is based?  Because, although Costa Coffee has hosted many a debate on grand strategy, it doesn’t actually count as an accredited military academy.

But, as we know, people don’t actually need to have a clue what they’re talking about – they can still talk.  The problem, says Sir Mick, is Israel’s 
own dysfunctional political system.  
And why is that political system so bad?  First, he explains, there are
the hazards of proportional representation.
And I thought “proportional” was actually a positive thing… stupid me!  I thought that it meant that each citizen gets a vote that is worth exactly the same; that the makeup of the Parliament is a true reflection of the views of the electorate, warts and all.  That’s not what ‘first past the post’ delivers. In 2019, for instance, 1 in every 8 Brits (circa 12%) voted for the Liberal Democrats; but, because of the ‘first past the post’ system, that party only has 11 MPs – i.e. a mere 1.7% of the House of Commons.  

In a proportional system, with 12% of the votes they would have gotten, of course 12% of the seats in Parliament – that’s what “proportional” means.

Don’t get me wrong: one can argue about the advantages and disadvantages of either system – till one’s blue in the face; if one donates to the Tories, I suppose that ‘first past the post’ is wonderful – it results in more bang for the buck; if I were to ask Liberal Democrat supporters, they might feel differently.  But is the “proportional representation” any less democratic?

So what is Sir Mick’s beef with Israel’s “proportional representation”.  Well, he tells us:
the outcome is a government the public didn’t vote for, led by a prime minister seemingly driven by holding onto power and propped up by parties who had previously pledged on principle not to govern with him.
So, Mr. Davis doesn’t like the outcome of the elections.  I get that.  I just don’t think that’s a good enough reason to change the system.  No disrespect, Sir Mick!

But why is this new government one “the public didn’t vote for”?  It represents a broad coalition, from left (the Israeli Labour Party) to centre (Blue & White) to right (Likud).  The prime minister will be Benjamin Netanyahu (leader of the largest party, which received 29% of the votes), followed by Benny Gantz (whose party received 27% of the votes).

True, before the elections Gantz promised not to serve in a Netanyahu government.  You caught him there, Mr. Davis, Sir!  He’s a terrible, terrible man – the first politician ever to break a pre-election promise.  I’m sure nothing like that ever happened while you were Chief Executive of the Conservative Party.  (In Gantz’s defence, he may have followed bad examples: before elections, every US president in the past 25 years promised to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.  It took a quarter of a century to find one that actually did – and I doubt you like him much.)

It is, I agree, terrible that Israel has such a “dysfunctional political system”.  It gets people frustrated.  So unlike UK’s wonderfully functional political system; the one that produced a pro-Remain Parliament despite a clear pro-Brexit referendum; plus 3 years of paralysis, a government begging for elections and an opposition courageously opposing them, etc. etc.

Where Sir Mick is right is that Israel will now have (for a while, at least) a Prime Minister who faces “corruption charges”.  Netanyahu stands accused of having traded favours in return for a ‘kinder treatment’ at the hands of a major news outlet.  British politicians would certainly never do anything like that!  Although there were things… I seem to remember quite a few MPs (including ministers and shadow ministers) dipping their hands rather dishonestly into the public purse…  But that’s a different thing altogether!

Oh, I do admire Sir Mick’s principled stance.  In fact, I herewith demand that Netanyahu’s sorry ass be put in prison – if found guilty by a court of law.  It’s just surprising for me to hear rumours that, in the past, Mr. Davis may have taken a less righteous position against alleged corruption by one of his own underlings.  Well, given those false rumours, I’m sure that Sir Mick cannot but agree with me that people (including the Chairman of the Jewish Leadership Council and the Prime Minister of Israel) are innocent, unless proven guilty.

It’s only halfway through his article that Mr. Davis comes to the issue that really awoke his ire: the planned annexation by Israel of parts of the West Bank – in accordance with the latest US ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan.
When we talk of existential threats to Israel, then annexation is the genuine article.
That’s, of course, a valid opinion.  Unfortunately for Mr. Davis, it is just the opinion of an outsider.  Sir Mick is not Israeli; he is a British citizen, paying his taxes in the UK.  It is Israeli citizens (i.e., people who live in Israel, pay taxes in Israel, serve in the army in Israel and risk being bombed to smithereens in Israel) that are entitled to decide (as opposed to opine) what constitutes genuine existential threats to Israel.  And a clear majority of those Israeli citizens voted for parties that accepted the US proposal.

But it doesn’t look like Sir Mick is content with ‘just’ an outsider’s opinion:
The keep your wallets open and mouths shut model of Israel-Diaspora relations was viable when Diaspora Jewry saw in Israel’s political leadership an embodiment of its values rather than a violation of them.
The “wallets open” was understood – and not just by me – as a hint.  After all, as the Jewish News says, Sir Mick is not just any outsider; he is
[o]ne of Britain’s biggest philanthropists to Israel.
I just wonder if, when Mr. Davis decided to give whatever he gave “to Israel” (or, more likely, to whatever causes and organisations he finds useful in Israel), he informed people that those donations came with a clear caveat: ‘I pay – I get the say’.  ‘Coz, had he said so to me (I’m Israeli), I would’ve told him to keep his money.  I have no idea what Sir Mick’s experience is with donations to the Conservative Party; but Israel is a sovereign country.

Isn't 'philanthropy' something done without ulterior motives?


Apparently, however, some sovereign countries have duties to set up other sovereign countries.  How else am I to understand Sir Mick’s sententious determination that Israel has a
moral and strategic imperative to extricate itself from ruling over [the Palestinians].
Before I read Sir Mick’s wise words, I rather stupidly thought it’s the task of every nation that doesn’t yet have independence to “extricate” itself from its rulers.  Including by making the necessary concessions and compromises to achieve that goal.  As Jews – and Indians, and Pakistanis – did in 1947.  In Sir Mick’s perfect world, however, it is the sacred duty of Israel to   offer
a tangible alternative on this issue.
Well, a (or, rather, another) “tangible alternative” has just been offered by the US Administration.  It may not be an administration to Sir Mick’s liking; it may not be an “alternative” he likes, or that the Palestinians like.  But, surely, Mr. Davis hasn’t made his millions by walking away from deals, simply because the opening offer wasn’t to his liking.  While the US document unsurprisingly expresses a US ‘Vision’, it also leaves the door wide open for negotiations:
The peace agreement that will hopefully be negotiated on the basis of this Vision should be implemented through legally binding contracts and agreements (the “ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENT”).
In fact, the reputed architects of the ‘Vision’ have gone to great pains to make that clear.  Speaking about the Palestinian leadership in an interview he gave to an Egyptian media outlet, Jared Kushner said:
If there are things they want to change, if they don’t like where we drew the lines, they should come and tell us.
Were they able and willing to make peace, the Palestinian leaders could simply have said ‘We agree with the principle that there should be an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.  Everything else – let’s negotiate.’

In the absence of such a response, Israel’s ‘duty’ of providing “a tangible alternative” becomes a duty to provide ‘a tangible alternative acceptable to the kind of leadership for whom no alternative was acceptable in the past 100 years’.  I am not as knowledgeable as Sir Mick – but I found no such ‘duty’ in the Torah.  Maybe it’s in the Statutes of Values of the Diaspora that he appears to own.

But the relationship with the Palestinians isn’t Sir Mick’s only imputation towards the Jewish state.  Israel, he intones
must radically improve social mobility within its own society.
And why does he think that Israel has such poor social mobility?  Because
for an OECD country, Israel’s gaps between rich and poor are extraordinary.
Some may view as ironic that a multi-multi-millionaire preaches about narrowing the “gaps between rich and poor”.  But beyond the irony, according to OECD data, Israel has a Gini Coefficient of 0.35.  UK’s is 0.36. Gini is a widely used measure of income inequality: 0 (zero) corresponds to perfect equality, 1 (one) to worst possible inequality – so the lower, the better.  Well, I’d like to think that Sir Mick applies more rigorous research and due diligence to his business dealings than he does to his pronouncements on social issues.  Otherwise, I’d say such sloppiness is… how should I put it… “extraordinary”!

Income Inequality in OECD countries.  Israel in red.  The UK is the 4th bar to the right of Israel.


Next, Sir Mick’s bounces from pseudo-economics back to pseudo-politics:
Israel advocates around the world, of which I am one, boast about the full citizenship rights of Israel’s Arab citizens and their role in Israeli life. However, the MKs those citizens elect are still considered governmentally trayf.
Firstly, on behalf of all my countrymen, I’d like to thank Sir Mick for his unparalleled advocacy.  It’s valiant defenders like him that make us feel so much safer!

However, the rest of the passage is a bit of a spin.  Those MKs are not considered “governmentally trayf” because they are Arabs (indeed, one of them happens to be Jewish); nor because they are elected by Arabs (there are Jews who vote for the ‘Arab List’ and there are Arabs who vote for the ‘Jewish’ parties);  no, the problem is not the ethnicity or religion of those MKs or of their supporters – but the political views that they represent.  It’s about Zionism vs. anti-Zionism, yes – but not just.  The Arab Joint List includes a communist party; a hyper-nationalist party; and an Islamist Party.  Given the record of those ideologies in the region and the world, mainstream Israeli politicians may perhaps be forgiven for not wanting such parties in the governing coalition.

But the issue is more fundamental than that.  In a parliamentary democracy, there is a right to vote, to elect their parliamentary representatives (and be elected as such); I wasn’t aware that there was a right to have one’s representatives included in the governing coalition – whatever their politics.  Are you making up democratic rules as you go along, Mr. Davis?

Apparently, Sir Mick’s list of Israel’s many violations of ‘values of the Diaspora’ also includes the fact that the Jewish state has failed to teach British Jews Hebrew:
How for example, can we nurture a thriving and mutual beneficial sense of shared peoplehood, when so many Diaspora Jews, particularly in the English-speaking world are unable to speak Hebrew, the language of their homeland?
That is indeed a problem – and I must thank Mr. Davis for pointing it out.  Too bad he pointed it out… in English; in a Diaspora Jewish English language newspaper!

And it’s not Israel’s only linguistic and cultural sin.  Mr. Davis also determines that:
Jewish Israelis need more and better education in Arabic and Arab culture. Arab Israelis need more and better education in Jewish culture and history.
Don’t you just looove one that always asks for “more and better” – but fails to even mention what has already been achieved?  To start with, most Israelis (or their parents or grandparents) hail from Arab lands – so Arab culture is hardly unfamiliar to them.  Arabic is part of the curriculum in most Israeli secular schools – at all levels.  True, it is not compulsory to study Arabic – it’s one of the optional languages students can choose to study (and many do).  In recent years, more teachers of Arabic are employed in Jewish schools – no doubt because Mr. Davis has determined that this is the way forward.  Most Arab Israeli parents understandably choose to give their kids an education in Arabic schools – but that education includes the study of Hebrew.

And actually, may I suggest that – before he idly shoots his mouth off again – Sir Mick takes the time and the trouble to watch the excellent Israeli series ‘Fauda’?  It is available on Netflix.  With English subtitles, Sir Mick; no worries!

Don’t get me wrong: Mr. Davis can actually have a say on how Israel looks like – and how she should look like in the future; once he comes to live there, of course.  I’m sure he has enough money to buy himself a decent flat in Sderot!

But, let’s face it – he is unlikely to make Aliyah.  In fact, he doesn’t even envisage such possibility.  He bashes Israel ‘as a Jew’ from the Diaspora.  Why?  A very charitable explanation would be ‘because he cares’.  It’s a very strange way to show it, but hey-ho…

Unfortunately, I am more inclined to believe an explanation that Sir Mick himself let slip at some point:
I think the government of Israel […] have to recognise that their actions directly impact me as a Jew living in London, the UK.  When they do good things it is good for me, when they do bad things, it's bad for me. And the impact on me is as significant as it is on Jews living in Israel.
There are no less than 4 rather emphatic me’s in that short peroration.  It would seem that Mick Davis does care deeply… about Mick Davis!

Well, Mr. Davis Sir, as an Israeli who served for 20 years in the IDF, I am sorry for all the inconvenience that we caused you!

Oh, and… for whatever it’s worth, this Jewish Israeli (of the Ashkenazi variety) loves the Arabic language and culture.  Take for instance this brilliant proverb, which applies so well to you and your hatchet-job of an article:
الكلاب تنبح والقافلة تسير
It means: ‘The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on’.  So long, Sir Mick!

Sunday, 29 July 2018

Israel’s Nation State Law: drink driving vs. sober analysis

Recently, the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) has adopted a piece of legislation entitled ‘Basic Law: Israel – the Nation State of the Jewish People’.  Pretty much everything that happens in Israel can be described as ‘controversial’ if one follows traditional news outlets (let alone the social media).  But this new law is certainly even more ‘controversial’ than usual.  It has been criticised by many in Israel and by most Jewish organisations in the Diaspora.  Others, of course, have defended it.
There are three main ‘strains’ of criticism: the first basically accuses the Israeli legislators of unnecessarily ‘rocking the boat’.  Indeed, despite the brouhaha, the new law does not ‘do’ anything; it has no practical effect, it does not change the reality on the ground one iota.
A second type of criticism is that the law is poorly designed and drafted: it includes superfluous articles, while leaving out important principles.
I confess that I feel a lot of sympathy towards both these criticisms.  But then there is a third category – those who claim that the law is terribly wrong, even utterly evil.  The degree of ‘wrong’ varies between ‘incompatible with democratic principles’ and ‘profoundly racist’ – depending mainly on the critic’s own ideological inclinations.
Confronted with this new development in Israel, most commentators did what they always do – they quoted other pundits.  I’m otherwise inclined – rather than playing the pointless ‘X said/Y said’ game, I suggest taking a look at the actual text and analysing it, article by article.  Tedious – I know; but also meaningful.  Those who have no patience for such things are invited to let journalists tell them what they should see and think.
If you are still with me, let’s see what we have:
1a. The Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established.
This is only controversial among Israel’s enemies.  It’s also hardly new: Israel’s Declaration of Independence famously stated:
The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.
 The League of Nations Mandate also declared
[R]ecognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country;
Let’s move on:
1b. The State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people, in which it fulfils its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.
This is nothing else than ‘Zionism in a nutshell’.
The next article is much more controversial:
1c. The right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.
I’ve heard a lot of criticism that points (without actually quoting it) to this particular article.  What I haven’t heard is a counter-proposal.  If we’re not saying that, what are we saying?
Are we saying that the Palestinian people also “has the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel”?  One can say that, if one is so disposed – but one cannot say that and militate for the two-state solution.  If the Palestinian people can exercise self-determination in Israel, then what’s the point of a Palestinian state?
Are we then saying that anyone who’s an Israeli citizen “has the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel”?  Again, one can say that – but how then is Israel “the national home of the Jewish people”?  How does one justify the Law of Return, which gives any member of the Jewish people (but not to non-Jews) the almost unconditional right to become an Israeli citizen?  How does one justify the Jewish character of the state – the flag, the symbols, the holidays, etc.?
Let me quote again from the League of Nations Mandate:
the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
It seems rather obvious: the League recognises that the ‘national rights’ belong to the Jewish people; when it comes to “the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, it sees only “civil and religious [but not national]rights”.
This is further strengthened in Article 4 of the Mandate:
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.
… and Article 7:
The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.
No equivalent provisions were envisaged for the non-Jewish communities.
Nor was that view abandoned with the dissolution of the League of Nations and its replacement by the United Nations.  UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II)/29 Nov. 1948 called for the establishment of two states and it referred to them as “the Jewish state” and “the Arab state” – although both states were to include minorities belonging to the other ethnicity.  In each state, the Resolution called for:
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
Again, the reference is to “civil, political, economic and religious [rights] […] and fundamental freedoms”, but not to ‘national rights’, or ‘national self-determination’.  To the authors of the Resolution, it seemed obvious that the ‘national’ rights in the Jewish state belonged to Jews – why else would they define it as “the Jewish state”?
Finally, Israel’s Declaration of Independence proclaimed
the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.
The Declaration also states:
The State of Israel […] will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture;
Just like the previous documents, the Declaration differentiates between on one hand ‘national rights’ (which it assigns to the Jewish people); and on the other hand other individual and collective rights, as well as basic freedoms, which are to be enjoyed by all inhabitants of the State, without discrimination.
Still, to people coming from a certain ideological environment, all this does not sound right.  In a recent Jewish Chronicle article, Jonathan Freedland fulminates:
Israel has explicitly granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another.
The article implies that this is inherently racist; it even hints that Israel may now be accused of apartheid – with more justification than before.  The author then goes on to claim that Israel is no longer a democratic country:
Those used to shouting that ‘Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East’ will need to find another slogan — because this is not how democracies behave.
Except that Freedland’s own country recognises Christmas and Easter as official state holidays (‘bank’ holidays).  Neither Rosh Hashanah, nor Eid-El-Fittr (or indeed Diwali, the Chinese New Year, etc.) enjoy that status.  The Christian cross (but not the Star of David or the Islamic Crescent) features on the national flag.   The Church of England is UK’s Established Church and no other faith has that status; the Head of State is also the Head of the Church, etc.  It would seem that – on some level at least – the UK has “granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another.”
UK does not have a constitution, so that ‘granting’ is done in practice.  But other countries do it explicitly – in fact at least as explicitly as Israel did.
Let’s have a look, for instance, at the Slovak Constitution.  Its Preamble proclaims:
We, the Slovak nation, mindful of the political and cultural heritage of our forebears, and of the centuries of experience from the struggle for national existence and our own statehood, in the sense of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire, proceeding from the natural right of nations to self-determination, together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with other democratic states, seeking the application of the democratic form of government and the guarantees of a free life and the development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity, that is, we, citizens of the Slovak Republic, adopt through our representatives the following Constitution.
Note that the Preamble postulates a “Slovak nation” acting “together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups”.  The term “together with”unites, but also divides.  It clearly says that “members of national minorities and ethnic groups” are not part of the “the Slovak nation”, though they arepart of the citizenry of the Slovak Republic.  In fact, the Preamble establishes two kinds of “we” – two collectives:
  • “We, the Slovak nation”, and
  • “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”.
The equation it draws is: “We, the Slovak nation” + “national minorities and ethnic groups” = “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”
How is this fundamentally different from ‘Jewish people’ and ‘Israeli citizens’?
Crucially, the Slovak Constitution talks about “the natural right of nations to self-determination” – a discussion included in the “Slovak nation” term of the equation and not in the ‘minorities/citizenry’ one.
This is not mere semantics.  Slovakia is home (but obviously not ‘national home’) to a sizable – circa 10% –  ethnic Magyar (Hungarian) minority, which has lived in the country for many centuries.
Demographics of Slovakia: the yellow areas have majority Magyar population.
Yet the Preamble to the Slovak Constitution is designed in ethnic terms.  References to “the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” are no doubt very meaningful to the (West-Slavic) “Slovak nation”; but the (non-Slavic) Magyar minority may find it hard to identify with such symbols of Slavic character.  In fact, they may be decidedly underwhelmed by “the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” (830-907 CE) and prefer to remember the Kingdom of Hungary, which – from circa 1000 CE until after World War I – included the territory of modern-day Slovakia.
The Slovak Constitution is not some outdated document, preserved merely by tradition: it was adopted in 1992.
Has Jonathan Freedland read the Slovak Constitution?  Would he say that it “has explicitly granted collective rights to one group of citizens and denied them to another”?  Would he say that it justifies claims of ‘apartheid’?
Yet Slovakia acceded to the European Union in 2004.  The accession process involves punctilious verification that the country fulfils the Accession Criteria, the first of which is:
political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
The European Union has judged Slovakia (with the Constitution I quoted from above) to fulfil the criterion above.

But let us return to the Israeli Nation State Law.  Paragraph 3 says:
3. The capital of the state: Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.
In the case of Israel (and only in the case of Israel!) this is seen by many as controversial.  But it isn’t new: it is nothing but ‘copy and paste’ from another Israeli law – ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel’, adopted in 1980!  Paragraph 1 of that law states:
Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.
Another controversial provision of the Nation Law states:
4a. The state’s language is Hebrew.
4b. The Arabic language has a special status in the state; Regulating the use of Arabic in state institutions or by them will be set in law.
4c. This clause does not harm the status given to the Arabic language before this law came into effect.
The BBC claims that the
so-called Jewish nation state bill […] downgrades Arabic from official language status
Except that Arabic has never been an official language in the State of Israel.  It has been (along with Hebrew and English) an official language in the British Mandate of Palestine.  While the State of Israel never declared Arabic (or English) an official language, it did enshrine in its laws and regulations the obligation of state institutions to provide services in Arabic, as well as Hebrew.  Articles 4b and 4c of the new law in effect guarantee the continuation of that obligation.
But is that (to borrow Jonathan Freedland’s expression) “how democracies behave”?  Let’s start with Jonny’s own country: it may surprise him to learn that the official language of the United Kingdom is English and… English.  Of course, the UK government provides services in Welsh (and occasionally in Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Bengali, etc.) – but these are not official languages in the UK.
The official language of Sweden is Swedish, notwithstanding the fact that a sizable proportion of Sweden’s population has Finnish as their mother tongue.
When it comes to language, Slovakia is infinitely harsher than Israel: a 2009 amendment to the ‘Language Law’ not only establishes Slovak as the only ‘state language’ throughout the country’s territory, but severely restricts the use of Hungarian – even among ethnic Magyars.
According to EU Observer:
The Law […] seeks to regulate any and all meetings, gatherings, associations and other forms of communication by insisting on the parallel use of the ‘state language’, Slovak, whenever and wherever members of the minority get together in public, and ‘public’ is very broadly defined. Thus, if a group of Hungarian-speakers establish a literary circle, say, their proceedings would have to have a parallel Slovak translation, whether anyone actually needed this or not.  Minority-language schools are obliged to run their administration and documentation in Slovak and the same applies to the health service. The armed forces, the police and the fire service are to be monolingually Slovak. This last, by way of example, creates interesting scenarios – thus in a Hungarian-speaking area, the firemen are very likely to be all Hungarian-speakers, but when putting out a fire, they must speak Slovak to each other and also, of course, to the owner of the house where the fire is.
Violating the Slovak Language Law is punishable by a fine of EUR 5,000 (equivalent to 5-6 months’ average wages in Slovakia).

But let’s go back to Israel’s newly adopted Nation State Law:
2a. The name of the state is ‘Israel.’
2b. The state flag is white with two blue stripes near the edges and a blue Star of David in the center.
2c. The state emblem is a seven-branched menorah with olive leaves on both sides and the word “Israel” beneath it.
2d. The state anthem is “Hatikvah.”
Details regarding state symbols will be determined by the law.

Jonathan Freedland might see these provisions as less controversial.  He would be wrong again, however.  It’s in the eye of the beholder, apparently.
Adalah is a foreign-funded Israeli Arab organisation which set as its mission
to promote human rights in Israel in general and the rights of the Palestinian minority, citizens of Israel, in particular.
Among other projects, Adalah compiled a database of Israeli ‘racist laws’ – laws that, in the organisation’s view, discriminate against the Arab minority.  This includes, for instance, the Flag and Emblem Law (adopted by the Knesset in 1949).  Adalah explains that the law
Adopts the flag of the First Zionist Congress and the Zionist Movement [which Adalah considers a colonial enterprise], a combination of a prayer shawl and the Shield of David, as the official flag of Israel.  The emblem of the State of Israel is a candelabrum, one of the symbols of the Temple era in Jewish history.
The Constitution of (EU member) Malta proclaims in Chapter 2: “The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. […] Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education.”
 Back to the Nation State Law:
5. Ingathering of the exiles: The state will be open for Jewish immigration and the ingathering of exiles
6. Connection to the Jewish people
6a. The state will strive to ensure the safety of the members of the Jewish people in trouble or in captivity due to the fact of their Jewishness or their citizenship.
6b. The state shall act within the Diaspora to strengthen the affinity between the state and members of the Jewish people.
6c. The state shall act to preserve the cultural, historical and religious heritage of the Jewish people among Jews in the Diaspora.
Jonathan Freedland appears to object less to these provisions.  Frankly, I can’t understand why.  If Israel is the embodiment of the Jewish right of self-determination, then they are easy to understand as expressions of that right; but if Israel embodies the right of self-determination of its Arab (or Palestinian Arab) citizens, then how does Freedland justify them?  Surely, that position should imply that Israel is obligated to rise to the defence of Palestinian besieged in the Yarmouk refugee camp – just as it would do if Yarmouk’s inhabitants were Jewish?  And why should the state “be open for Jewish immigration”, but not for Palestinian Arab immigration (or indeed for the ‘return’ of Palestinian refugees and their descendants)?  Freedland’s (unstated, but implied) views necessarily lead to the position of Adalah, which postulates that Israel’s preferential immigration law is discriminatory and racist.
7. Jewish settlement: The state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.
Here, a tedious linguistic explanation is necessary: the English word 'settlement' is likely to be misinterpreted, because it’s been intensively used (and abused) in relation to Israeli towns and villages beyond the Green Line.  But that would be a mistranslation.  The Hebrew word for ‘settling beyond the Green Line’ is ‘hitnahalut’.  But the law talks about “hityiashvut” – which is the word used for Jewish settlement before the establishment of the State (the term Yishuv – used to refer to the Jewish community in the British Mandate of Palestine – comes from the same root).  So no – this has nothing to do with the ‘illegal settlements’.
In fact, this paragraph of the law mimics the language of the League of Nations mandate, which called on the Administration of Palestine to “encourage […] close settlement by Jews on the land”.
Back to the Nation Law again:
8. Official calendar: The Hebrew calendar is the official calendar of the state and alongside it the Gregorian calendar will be used as an official calendar. Use of the Hebrew calendar and the Gregorian calendar will be determined by law.
9. Independence Day and memorial days
9a. Independence Day is the official national holiday of the state.
9b. Memorial Day for the Fallen in Israel’s Wars and Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day are official memorial days of the State.
10. Days of rest and Sabbath: The Sabbath and the festivals of Israel are the established days of rest in the state; Non-Jews have a right to maintain days of rest on their Sabbaths and festivals; Details of this issue will be determined by law.

These paragraphs sketch the Jewish character of the state.  Once more, they might look less controversial to Jonathan Freedland – but these aspects are listed in Adalah’s database of ‘discriminatory laws in Israel’.
The national anthem of Cyprus praises the “Greeks of old”. Which might not impress the country’s ethnic Turkish citizens. 
Finally:
11. Immutability: This Basic Law shall not be amended, unless by another Basic Law passed by a majority of Knesset members.
Which says that the Nation State Law can only be amended by another Basic Law – and not by ‘just any old law’.
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When all is said and done, the crux of the matter remains paragraph 1c, which makes “national self-determination in the State of Israel” a unique prerogative of the Jewish people.
Jonathan Freedland believes that this is inherently undemocratic and racist; that it turns Arab Israelis into ‘second-class citizens’.
As I’ve shown, if this is true of Arab Israelis, it is also true of Slovak Magyars and other minorities.  But is it?  Well, it depends on the ideology one chooses to subscribe to.  More precisely, it depends on where one chooses to position oneself on the universalism-vs.-particularism scale (I’ve touched briefly on this subject here).
For extreme universalists, states (viewed at best as a temporary and necessary evil) exist as artificial constructs, aimed at placing barriers between people.  For extreme particularists, they are exclusive ethnic fortresses, to be fiercely defended against any foreign trespassers.  In-between, however, there is a wide range of legitimate opinions.
Sadly, in Jonathan Freedland’s world, there is but one ‘good’ opinion (indeed, just one legitimate world view) – the one he subscribes to.  Anyone who dares disagree is automatically placed outside what David Hirsch calls ‘the community of the Good’; s/he is racist, undemocratic, etc.  Well, I’m afraid, Jonny dear, that this in itself smacks of intolerance and bigotry.
I resent ethnic exclusivism and despise ethnic supremacism; but I also view the state as repository of a people’s historical and cultural heritage, a ‘safe space’ for a particular flavour of humanity to develop and grow.  Complemented and enriched by others – yes; overwhelmed by others – no.
In its most profound sense, ‘national self-determination’ means the right of a people to impart to their state its distinct, unique, ‘national’ character.  It’s about flavour and texture Jonny – not power and subjugation.
I strongly believe that Arab Israelis should have equal political, civil, economic and social rights, as well as personal and collective freedoms.  They should be free to use their own language, to develop, enjoy and pass on to future generations their own culture.  Israel is their home – in every sense but one.  Physically, politically, legally, economically and socially Arab Israelis fully ‘belong’ in the State of Israel – just like Slovak Magyars ‘belong’ in Slovakia.  But we also need to understand that Arab Israelis will always look to the Arab world (and – one day if they so desire – to a Palestinian Arab state) as their cultural and ‘national’ home.  Just like Slovak Magyars will look to Hungary; just like Swedish Finns look to Finland; and – dare I say – just like British Jews look to Israel.  There is nothing wrong with that; nothing untoward or illegitimate.  That makes them neither a ‘fifth column’, nor ‘second class citizens’.
These are my views.  Jonathan Freeland is, of course, welcome to his opinions – as long as they are logical and consistent.  But there is a huge internal contradiction in his world view: even while railing against Israel’s Nation Law, Mr. Freedland is asking the UK Labour Party to adopt in full the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism.  Jonathan objects to the fact that Labour has excluded from their Code of Conduct some of the examples of antisemitism – including
Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavo[u]r.
But if Jonathan claims that the right of self-determination of Palestinian citizens of Israel should be satisfied in Israel, then it follows that the right of self-determination of British Jews should be satisfied in Britain (and that of Russian Jews in Russia, etc.)  How, then, does Jonathan Freedland justify his other claim, that the right of self-determination of Jews is embodied by the State of Israel and that denying that right (i.e. denying Israel’s right to exist as the State of the Jews) is an antisemitic prejudice?  And how does he justify his demand for a separate Palestinian state?
Ideology is like alcohol: it affects people’s ability to think straight and constrains their peripheral vision.  One should neither drive a car, nor write a political article while ‘under the influence’!
 
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