Let's talk about genocide(s)!

Storm over The Hague

We’ve all – at some point in our lives – heard the saying “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  But have we stopped to think why that should be so?  Why would good intentions produce bad outcomes?  I suggest the answer is “because those good intentions are taken to extremes”.  We tend to fall in love with those intentions, to the extent of suspending our critical thinking.

Take the biblical injunction “justice, justice thou shalt pursue”: what can be wrong with bringing more justice to the world?

Quite a lot, potentially.  Because the blind pursuit of justice can actually produce injustice.  When justice becomes an ideological project – something to be maximised at all costs – rather than a principle to be applied with reason and restraint, it can ultimately undermine both the rule of law it is supposed to serve and the peace it is meant to bring.

We are beginning to see precisely this problem in the almost fanatical drive to criminalise conflict and expand the role of international courts.

More than eight decades ago, as the Holocaust was unfolding (around 63% of Europe’s Jews would eventually be murdered), a Polish Jew called Rafał Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’.  Linguistically, it derived from the Greek ‘genos’ (people or ‘race’) and the Latin ‘cidium’ (killing).  Lemkin’s moral sensitivity had identified that what the Nazis were doing was worse even than mass murder: what they intended to kill was not just ‘a very large number of people,’ but a people as such: they were attempting to erase a particular flavour of humanity.  No wonder that this was soon labelled “the crime of crimes”.

The term resonated.  By 1948, in response to the Holocaust, the governments of UN member states formulated and adopted an international treaty meant to criminalise it and prevent it from recurring: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

At the heart of its definition were the words:

"acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group"

As we have seen, the essential idea behind ‘genocide’ is the intention to destroy a people.  So why “in whole or in part”?

That phrase was proposed by the Norwegian delegate, Finn Moe Wikborg.  His explanation could hardly have been simpler:

"it was not necessary to kill all the members of a group in order to commit genocide."

Of course not.  Otherwise, Hitler could theoretically have argued that the Holocaust was not genocide because he talked only about exterminating European Jewry: Jews in America might have survived.  Or a genocidaire intent on exterminating an entire people could claim that no genocide had occurred if he were stopped after murdering ‘just’ half of them.

In other words, “in part” appears to address the extent of the destruction, not to change the object of the intention.  The intended target remains a people as such.

Though in many ways different from the Holocaust, Rwanda provides another unequivocal example of genocide.  In 1994, Hutu extremists set out to destroy the Tutsi population of Rwanda.  The methods were different from those of the Nazis and the killing was compressed into little more than three months, but the essential intention was the same: the target was not ‘simply’ a large number of Tutsis because they were Tutsis, but the Tutsi as a people. Hundreds of thousands were murdered as the perpetrators sought a Rwanda in which that particular flavour of humanity no longer existed.  This was genocide according to the Convention, but also in the original, intuitive sense of the word.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a UN criminal tribunal created by the Security Council, had no problem ruling this was a genocide.

Then came Srebrenica.  In July 1995, towards the end of the Bosnian war, Bosnian Serb forces under General Ratko Mladić captured Srebrenica, a predominantly Muslim enclave that had been declared a UN ‘safe area’.  They forcibly removed some 30,000 women, children and elderly people.  Over the following days, Bosnian Serb forces systematically killed between 7,000 and 8,000 Muslim men and boys, the overwhelming majority executed in cold blood after capture rather than in combat.

Srebrenica Genocide Memorial

There is no question that this was a horrendous war crime.  But was this an attempt to exterminate the Bosnian Muslim people as such?  The murders were horrific, but they were localised; even within Srebrenica, the women, children and elderly were expelled rather than killed.

Yet the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) eventually ruled that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide, even though Srebrenica’s Muslims represented a relatively small proportion of Bosnia’s entire Muslim population.  With the world shocked by the enormity of the crime and demanding justice, the judges must surely have felt considerable pressure not to appear timid by withholding the label of genocide.

To get there, the judges interpreted “in part” literally: the intention did not have to be to destroy the Bosnian Muslim people as such; it could be to destroy a part of that people – in this case, the Muslim community of Srebrenica, through the killing of its men and boys.

However, the literal interpretation creates an obvious problem: every community is “part” of a larger “whole”.  What if antisemites attempted to murder all five Jewish families living in a particular village?  This would be a horrific pogrom; but is every pogrom a genocide?  Taken to its extreme, “in part” could make any racially motivated murder a genocide.

The judges recognised the problem. Their solution was to introduce a term that does not appear anywhere in the Convention: in order to qualify as genocide, the targeted “part” had to be “substantial”.

But what is “substantial”?  The judges established no numerical threshold.  Instead, they created an ad hoc test: numbers were the necessary starting point, but they could also consider the prominence of the “part” within the larger group, whether it was “emblematic” of that group or “essential to its survival”, and even the geographical reach of the perpetrators.  None of these considerations was decisive; they were merely “useful guidelines”, to be considered according to the circumstances of each case.

So what’s wrong with that? Well, for starters, the judges may have misinterpreted the original intention behind the Convention’s “in whole or in part”: that phrase may have referred to how much of the group was actually destroyed, rather than how much of it the perpetrators intended to destroy.

There is a wider problem with the overly ‘literal’ interpretation of law.  Laws are made of words, and words cannot anticipate every circumstance.  Take theft.  Most of us have a pretty clear idea of what theft means: taking something that belongs to somebody else with the intention of keeping it.  But suppose I find a wallet containing £100 in a park.  I look around for its owner and ask the people nearby, but nobody can identify it.  Eventually I pocket the money.

Have I “appropriated property belonging to another”?  Literally, yes.  Does that make me a thief?  Most people would instinctively say no.  Yet an excessively literal reading of the law could produce precisely that result.  The definition would have perverted the concept it was intended to define.

Words matter, but the meaning of law cannot be reduced to textual dissection. Definitions must be interpreted in the light of the thing they were intended to describe and the purpose for which they were enacted.  The common law must not replace common sense.

By interpreting the genocide definition literally rather than logically, the Srebrenica ruling created a legal concept of ‘genocide’ that was different from – and arguably at odds with – the common understanding of the term.

Remember that ‘genocide’ fundamentally means the attempt to erase a people, an entire flavour of humanity.  In other words, the ultimate victim is not just the people targeted, but humanity itself.  Genocide is a ‘crime against humanity’ in common understanding, not merely in legal terminology.

Ironically, the judges themselves understood this perfectly well.  In the appeal judgment, they explained that genocidaires “identify entire human groups for extinction” and attempt to “deprive humanity of the richness” provided by its different peoples.

That profound description aligns both with the common meaning of the term and with the original intention of the Convention.  But it sits uneasily with the legal test they had constructed and with the Srebrenica ruling itself.  If humanity is the ultimate victim because one of its constituent peoples is marked for extinction, how can the destruction of a relatively small local community – let alone one whose women, children and elderly were deliberately allowed to survive – be construed as the same crime?

Srebrenica was far from the end of this process.  On the contrary, it established a precedent: genocide no longer necessarily meant an attempt to erase a people as such. Once the concept had been detached from that intuitive meaning, the door was open to applying the “crime of crimes” label to conflicts that looked very different from either the Holocaust or Rwanda.

Which brings us to Gaza.  According to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Ministry of Health, more than 73,000 Palestinians (civilians and combatants) were killed during nearly three years of war with Israel.  This represents circa 3.3% of Gaza’s population and 0.5% of the global Palestinian population.

But it didn’t take three years for the ‘genocide’ accusations to surface – they did so already in October 2023.  By 29 December, when the reported death toll stood at around 21,500 – approximately 1% of Gaza’s population and 0.14% of Palestinians worldwide – South Africa had already applied to the International Court of Justice, alleging that Israel was committing genocide and demanding that the Court make it stop.

Ultimately, the Court did not satisfy South Africa’s demands – but nor did it throw out the case.  It found that the Palestinians in Gaza had a “plausible” right to be protected from acts of genocide and that there was a real and imminent risk of irreparable harm to that right. It therefore ordered a series of “provisional measures”.

Crucially, however, it did not rule that genocide was taking place.  Deciding on the actual merits of South Africa’s claim – in other words, whether Israel had indeed committed genocide – will take years.  Meanwhile, South Africa has requested – and received – another 18 months to prepare its next submission. As a result, the written proceedings alone will now stretch at least into 2029.

But court proceedings are one thing and political activism quite another: for many, that the Jewish state is guilty of genocide has already become an article of faith and an incontrovertible ‘social media truth’.

Nor is Gaza unique. Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has likewise generated widespread accusations that Russia itself is committing genocide against Ukrainians – although the existence of Ukrainians as a people does not appear to be at risk; not even at ‘plausible’ risk.

One can imagine a future – and not a remote one – in which every military conflict will be accompanied by accusations of genocide, with one or both sides being dragged before an international court to litigate the matter for years.

A certain category of political activists would like nothing better: they see this as strengthening international institutions and an end to impunity.  Many may even believe that this would eventually make war itself a much more costly – and therefore much less appealing – proposition.

But they are wrong: moral value, like monetary value, is subject to inflation. Printing more of the highest-denomination notes does not make us richer; it merely devalues that currency.  Calling ever more conflicts ‘genocides’ does not make war less likely – it makes genocide less exceptional.  It trivialises ‘the crime of crimes’ into the crime of many.

Worse, the relentless criminalisation of conflict may actually make disputes more difficult to resolve.  Why would Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiate in good faith and seek to resolve their differences through accommodation when they can both take the other to the ICJ, seeking legal vindication from above?  And how could any Palestinian leader make peace  with the Jewish state – a peace that necessarily involves mutual concessions – when it's become an article of faith that Israel committed genocide against his people?

And it’s not ‘just’ about war and genocide.  Since the ICJ ruled that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank is unlawful and must unconditionally end – why would Palestinians offer Israel any concessions merely for fulfilling what they now see as a legal obligation?

“The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”  Even when pursued with the best of intentions, the relentless drive to expand the reach and power of international institutions (especially the courts) may lead to very bad outcomes.

But what is the alternative?  Restraining that drive may sound suspiciously like granting impunity.  If international courts cannot hold dictators, generals and governments to account, who will? Should we simply accept that terrible crimes will go unpunished because the international machinery capable of punishing them is imperfect?

No. The way forward is neither impunity nor ‘international’ moral inflation; it is enhanced national justice. After all, why do dictators so often escape justice – as in the case of Omar al-Bashir? Not because they’re not prosecuted internationally (they often are); but because they’re never held accountable at home.

And why is that?  Because dictatorships, almost by definition, start by emasculating the very institutions that might hold tyrants accountable.

Now imagine a world in which every national court is independent; the press is free, the public debate unfettered; rulers are all accountable to law and to the voter.  Why would we even need international courts?

You want a fairer world?  Fight for power to the people, not power over peoples.  Independent national institutions, not politicised international courts.  Democracy in every nation, not international judicial oversight. Just and judicious politics, not politics by judicial means.

Justice, justice thou shalt pursue!

Farmisht about Gaza?

In Yiddish, פאַרמישט (farmisht, pronounced almost exactly like 'famished' in English) means 'confused'.  So, is Gaza famished, or are we farmisht?

On 22 August 2025, the IPC Global Partnership – a coalition of charities, governmental and UN agencies – classified the situation in one of Gaza’s 5 governorates as ‘Famine’.  Now let’s unpack that label.

The shifting shifty definition

Famine isn’t a new phenomenon. What’s new in our modern world is an institutionalised effort to combat it.  This gave birth to a plethora of charities and aid agencies, each with its own priorities, standards, procedures and methods of providing relief.

Faced with recurring famine in Africa, by 2004 a UN agency sponsored the creation of a unified, scientifically rigorous methodology for quantifying food insecurity.  Dubbed ‘the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’ and eventually codified in a Technical Manual, it defined 5 degrees of severity, with ‘Famine’ being the worst level.  To assess that, it quantified 3 different criteria:

1. Household food consumption;
2. Acute malnutrition;
3. Mortality.

Thresholds were established for each of these, with ‘Famine’ requiring “[e]vidence that all three criteria” exceed their respective thresholds.

By 2009, a bureaucratic apparatus called IPC Global Partnership (backed by the UN, charities and aid agencies) was established to apply the IPC methodology.  In practice, this put the process in the hands of a small army of eager activists and activist scientists.  They’re typically keen to find ‘Famine’: it justifies their own existence, but also finds favour in the eyes of their stakeholders – charities and agencies whose role is to deliver aid.  That's where Science meets Politics.

In October 2024, as the conflict in Gaza entered its second year, the IPC produced a ‘Famine Factsheet,’ introducing a new concept: ‘Famine with Reasonable Evidence’:

“An area is classified in Famine with reasonable evidence if there is clear evidence that two of the three thresholds . . . have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess [that] . . . the third outcome has likely been reached.”

So instead of “all three criteria”, this new classification required just two, with the third left at the discretion of ‘analysts’ – rather than based on evidence.  But, at least, “clear evidence” was seemingly required for the other two criteria.

Yet in May 2025 – while Israel and the US promoted Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as an alternative to the UN aid apparatus – the IPC issued a Technical Note, this time claiming:

“An area is classified in Famine with reasonable evidence if minimally adequate evidence is available on two out of the three . . . to support the classification.”

To summarise: in 2019, the IPC required reliable evidence over all 3 criteria; by 2024, this was reduced in practice to “clear evidence” for 2 out of 3; and by 2025, the requirement was just “minimally adequate evidence,” again for 2 out of 3…

The Technical Manual has not been updated: that would require agreement from too many stakeholders.  Yet the goalposts were surreptitiously shifted by means of ‘factsheets’ and ‘notes’.  So much for ‘scientific integrity’!

Getting in vs. getting there

IPC assessments are entirely based on outcomes, not inputs.  I.e., they classify famine in an area only by looking at population data (food consumption, physical signs of malnutrition, mortality), not at the amounts of food going in.

This is justified: the fact that food enters a territory doesn’t mean it reaches everybody in sufficient quantities.  But, unlike the IPC, we may be interested in food input data, as well – if not to rebut the claim of Famine, then certainly to analyse its causes.

Fortunately, such data is available.  To preclude argument about its reliability, I’ll only use data from the IPC itself and from UN sources.  Israel claims that these numbers are understated, but let’s not get hung up on that; they’re certainly not overstated.

Firstly, however: how much food is needed in Gaza?  You may have heard or read (from the BBC and others) that the UN says ‘600 truckloads a day’.  Well, forget that number.  It’s a lie based on a misrepresentation.  UN’s own World Food Program (WFP) requires:

“At least 100 aid trucks per day to be allowed through northern, central and southern border points in a sustained and predictable manner.”

The IPC itself says:

“Estimates from the FAO21 and the WFP22 converge around 60,000 – 62,000 metric tonnes (MT) needed each month to meet minimum daily caloric requirements.”

Which boils down to the same number: 100 truckloads a day, given that a truckload of emergency food is equivalent to c. 20 metric tonnes.

So how much food is being delivered?  Again from the IPC itself:

“55,600 metric tonnes of food entered Gaza in the first half of August…”

That’s in excess of 3,700 metric tonnes (more than 185 truckloads) a day.

So how can there be famine?  The IPC, of course, blames Israel.  Even 185 truckloads daily, they say,

“remains largely insufficient to offset the prolonged deficits.”

But talking about “accumulated deficits” is utterly dishonest.  Yes, people may eat more in August, because they lived on lower rations in July.  But they cannot eat 85% more than normal; nor should they, even if they could.

In fact, in its own report, the IPC claims that, to recover the deficit

“can take months with 25% more calories than typically needed, depending on the severity of malnutrition.”

That's because eating 25% more than normal is the feasible and safe way to recover past deficits.  But in the 1^st half of August what entered the Strip was not 25%, but 85% more than needed.  And, by the way, it did not stop: truckloads continued to enter at pace.  According to COGAT (but not expressly contested by the UN) 320 truckloads entered on 17 August, 250 on 20 August, 220 on 21 August…  In total, 1,600 truckloads during the week 18-24 August alone – though some of them carried non-food aid.

Eventually, the IPC gets to the crux of the matter:

“In addition, security and operational challenges have prevented much of the incoming food from reaching the population. Aid deliveries have been severely disrupted—with 87 percent of UN trucks reportedly intercepted—reflecting the extreme desperation of the population.”

In other words, the food got into Gaza – but it didn’t reach the hungry people, because the vast majority was “intercepted” (read: looted or taken over) en-route.  IPC rather spuriously attributes this to “the extreme desperation of the population”.  But one would expect those most in need to also be the most desperate.  On the other hand, it is also claimed that those most in need were not the ones getting the food.

It's impossible to accurately determine who are the looters – whether hungry and angry people, criminal gangs or Hamas operatives (or a combination thereof): none of those groups is in the habit of issuing membership cards – and they all consist primarily of males aged of 12 to 60, who are dressed in civilian clothes and look exactly the same.  What’s clear is that Hamas and fellow travellers continue to fire their weapons for nigh on 2 years now – and they haven't subsisted all that time just on fervent prayer!

August 2025: Gazan men taking over a truck transporting aid

The point is that, if Gazans don’t get the food, it’s not because Israel doesn’t allow it in – but because it gets stolen by other Gazans.

Assessing the assessments

But, as mentioned, all this is of little relevance to the IPC: they make their determinations based on outcomes, not inputs.

Except that, in the case of Gaza, it’s not easy to reliably determine those outcomes.  Take for instance the first criterion, which assesses household food consumption.  In the Gaza Governorate, this was based mostly on surveying a sample of respondents: 504 were interviewed over the phone.  A second survey, involving 350 respondents, was apparently also conducted among the same population, but the IPC report does not make it clear how they were interviewed and whether the two samples overlapped.

Respondents are asked: “How many times, in the last 7 days have you eaten meat, fish or eggs?  Beans, lentils and peas?  Vegetables?  Fruit?  Milk/yoghurt/cheese?  Sugar?  etc.” 

Also “In the past 7 days, how many times did you have to eat less preferred/less expensive food?  How many times did you have to reduce portions?  To skip meals?  To borrow food from relatives?”

And finally “In the past 30 days, was there ever a time when there was no food in the house?  When you had to go to bed hungry?  When you went for an entire day with no food?” (answers: “Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often”).

Responses are distilled into numeric scores which (after some additional ‘expert manipulation’), are compared to IPC thresholds – resulting in an assessment of food consumption.  For ‘Famine’ classification, at least 20% of households must experience ‘extremely poor food consumption’.

The second criterion is ‘Acute Malnutrition’.  This is normally assessed by surveying children aged 6-59 months.  Their weight and height are measured and compared with age-specific thresholds.  A famine classification requires at least 30% of children below norm.

But, says the IPC, performing such measurements in a conflict area is difficult.  Surveyors would have to visit remaining neighbourhoods and tent cities, armed with scales and measuring boards…  Which is why the IPC instituted a shortcut: instead of performing rigorous height-and-weight surveys, it makes do with measuring the children’s upper arm circumference.  And instead of representative population samples, they measure children who are ‘normally’ brought to medical facilities (clinics and hospitals), usually because they need treatment – either for malnutrition or for any other illness.  The age is considered irrelevant, as long as it’s within range (6-59 months).  All that’s needed is a special measuring tape, one available anyway in most such facilities.  The measurement itself takes seconds and is part of the child’s routine examination.  The ‘Famine’ threshold in this case is 15%, rather than 30%, since the method is supposedly less sensitive.

Measuring a child's upper arm circumference. Red means 'below threshold'. Obviously younger children have smaller arms - but in a representative sample age is supposed to 'even out' statistically.

The main issue here is response/result bias.  This is a known problem in all such surveys and the IPC claims that it knows how to deal with it.  But their tendency is to see under-, rather than overstating.  Not necessarily wrong: in some cultures, people hide malnutrition, out of a sense of social shame.  But Gaza is surely different.  Firstly, many inhabitants have been publicly receiving aid – for many years.  Secondly, there’s not just a political, but also a huge practical incentive to exaggerate: given the unusually high ‘interest’ that ‘the international community’ manifests in this particular conflict, reports of catastrophic famine are seen as more likely to bring not just more aid, but also an end to the war.  If you were a Gazan responding to such a survey (after 22 months of hardship, displacement, bombardments and generally shitty life – how likely would you be to ‘embellish a bit’ when answering those questions?

And how likely would you be, if you were a Palestinian nurse or doctor, to deliberately report lower arm circumferences?  All you’d need to do is ‘steal’ a few millimetres by tightening the tape a tad more; or just skew the results by preferentially measuring younger children (say, more 2-year-olds and fewer 4 year olds…)

The IPC says it ‘validates’ the data by ‘triangulation’ – meaning they look not just at one parameter, but at several; they point at the convergence of that data.  The problem with that is we’re talking about sets of unreliable data, which should all be expected to err in the same direction.

The raw data, by the way, is not published – just IPC's 'expert interpretation' thereof.  Like medieval catholic priests, the IPC 'experts' want to ensure that the Bi... err... the data are 'correctly' interpreted.

Uncounted or undead?

This should make the third criterion (malnutrition-related mortality) even more important: deaths are more difficult to manipulate.  After all, dead people have identities, families and eventually graves.

IPC’s daily mortality threshold for famine is 2 deaths per 10,000 people.  According to the IPC, more than 500,000 people live in Famine in the Gaza Governorate.  This means over 100 deaths a day.  Since the IPC classification refers to the period 1 July – 15 August 2025, the deaths add up to over 4,600.

But even the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry only claimed c. 200 deaths in that period (see here and here).

The IPC report admits that “[t]he analysis team could not conclude on mortality evidence”.  Meaning: there wasn’t even “minimally adequate evidence” for that.

Hence, this was referred to ‘assessment by experts’ – who promptly performed a sleight-of-hand: they simply claimed that Hamas was under-counting deaths.

“Different analyses indicate that MoH [Minister of Health] data systematically underestimate overall mortality, highlighting structural limitations in mortality surveillance.”

The Hamas-run Gaza Minister of Health is – let’s recall – the same ‘source’ that the UN and most journalists proclaim as ‘reliable’ in terms of counting Palestinian victims of the ‘Israeli aggression’…  And 200 instead of 4,600 is one hell of an underestimate!

As for the “[d]ifferent analyses” mentioned above, none of them is directly relevant – or even refers to the same time period that the IPC deals with!

Conclusion

IPC’s analysis is not just flawed, but fundamentally dishonest: based on moving the goalposts, on unreliable surveys and on unreasonable ‘assessments’.  It’s a betrayal of IPC’s role, of their principles and of the people they’re supposed to help.  There’s no ‘Famine’ in Gaza – not in the way they themselves defined it.

But that doesn’t mean there isn’t hunger.  The fact that more than enough calories get in doesn’t mean they reach all those who need them.  Not just because Hamas steals them; nor because ‘people are desperate’.  But because in Gaza – as elsewhere – the powerful (be they Hamas, criminals or just those with big elbows) take more than their fair share; some will even profit from the plight of their fellow men. 

Whatever the cause, there’s hardship and human suffering in Gaza.  But lying ain’t the way to end it.

Let’s stop fantasizing that civilians can lead quasi-normal lives, while trapped in war zones.  Let’s stop pretending that ‘a permanent ceasefire’ isn’t crowning terrorists as victors.  The only way to defeat Hamas without starving, hurting and killing innocents is allowing the latter to flee Gaza.

For those who wave the flag of 'international law' at every opportunity, here's a provision of the 4th Geneva Convention (Art. 35):

"All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State."

The UN proclaims that Palestinian civilians in Gaza are "protected persons" and requires Israel ("the State") to treat them as such.  But they oppose allowing the former to escape.

Via its refugee protection agency (UNHCR), the UN also proclaims that a neutral neighbouring state cannot legally close its border to those in danger:

"Denying access to territory and asylum procedure . . . blatantly contradicts international law and . . . provisions of the . . . Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its Additional Protocol of 1967."

Egypt is a signatory to both the Convention and its Additional Protocol.  It has accepted more than one million refugees – mostly from war-torn Sudan and Syria; but not from Gaza.

EU member countries are also signatories.  They have accepted more than 4.3 million refugees from Ukraine; but not from Gaza.

The UK (another signatory) has instituted a special visa category for Ukrainians – 274,000 visas were issued to asylum-seekers from Ukraine; but not from Gaza.

Egypt, EU, UK... these are all countries that preach to Israel about international law and humanitarianism.

If IPC and their UN masters had any integrity, that’s what they’d advocate: for Gazans to be offered (at least temporarily) refuge – both among their Arab brethren and in the West.  Anyone not recognising the Gazans' right, in the midst of a war, to seek asylum in neutral countries is being driven by base hypocrisy and ugly antisemitism, not by noble ‘humanitarian’ concerns!

BBC: One isn’t a jihadist if one just kills Jews

 "I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?"

William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice

 

Let me be clear from the very beginning: the BBC never said ‘One isn’t a jihadist if one just kills Jews’ – though what they did say boils down to it. I wouldn’t normally stoop to this sort of dishonest headline tactics – it’s not my style.  But the BBC is utterly, outrageously dishonest in its reporting on Jews and the Jewish state – so I believe they deserve a taste of their own medicine.

As everybody knows, the BBC stubbornly refused to refer to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizb’ullah, etc. as ‘terrorists’ – even after 7 October 2023, when they butchered and abducted random civilians in the name of ‘the cause’.  At the time, the Beeb rolled out ‘veteran journalists’ such as John Simpson, who ponderously explained:

“Terrorism is a loaded word . . . It's simply not the BBC's job to tell people . . . who are the good guys and who are the bad guys.

We regularly point out that the British and other governments have condemned Hamas as a terrorist organisation, but that's their business . . . The key point is that we don't say it in our voice. Our business is to present our audiences with the facts, and let them make up their own minds.”

Except that the BBC did say “terrorist” in their own voice, when referring to the Manchester Arena bomber and his purported accomplices. That’s of course different because… err… they didn’t kill Jews?

The Beeb never referred to the 7 October 2023 massacre (1,195 people killed) as a ‘terror attack’.  But they did so in reference to other, decidedly smaller incidents: for instance the 2016 attack at Brussels International Airport (32 fatalities) and the 2017 London Bridge attack (8 dead).

But why am I bringing all this up – you might ask – almost two years after that shameful BBC decision?  Because relatively recently (20 June 2025), I came across a BBC news item entitled “Jihadists on 200 motorbikes storm Niger army base”.

Why, I wondered, was the BBC referring to Islamist terrorists storming an army base in Africa as “jihadists”, while claiming that a much larger attack on civilian communities in Israel was perpetrated by “militants”?

So I put pen to paper (figuratively, of course: I actually used a laptop) and sent a complaint to the BBC, asking them to explain that discrepancy.

No journalistic dinosaur with a God complex was available to reply to an ignorant pleb like me; but an Assistant Editor at the BBC News Editorial Standards informed me that

“Hamas is not typically classified as a jihadist group, unlike the Islamic State (IS) group which claimed the attack on the army base in Niger.

IS promotes a violent transnational Islamist ideology, whereas Hamas and PIJ are localised groups whose focus is the Israel-Palestinian conflict, in particular the replacement of Israel with an Islamic state in Palestine.

As such, we feel it is clearer to readers to describe Hamas and PIJ as armed groups rather than jihadist, as their fight is against the Israeli state.”

So there you are: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad aren’t jihadists – because they only kill Jews.  So Saith the BBC.

I briefly wondered whether the Assistant Editor blushed when arguing that line?  ‘Briefly’, because I once again got on my laptop, to point out to the BBC that the ‘difference’ between “transnational” and “localised” was cut entirely out of new cloth.

Firstly, because – far from being “localised” – both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are merely local branches of transnational movements.

In its Covenant, Hamas describes itself as

“one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine . . . a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times”

But hey – what does Hamas know?  Nothing is true unless the BBC Saith it.

Fortunately, the BBC – aiming no doubt to enlighten dumb members of the audience like myself – did saith it.  They published an explanatory article helpfully entitled “What is jihadism?”

That article beats around the bush a lot; but the gist of it is that “jihadism” consists of two elements:

1. An Islamist ideology;
2. Willingness to employ violence in order to promote it.

The BBC did call Hamas “Islamist” (albeit very occasionally) in the past.  As for the use of violence… I figured that post 7 October even the Assistant Editor might find it a bit too embarrassing to argue that point.

But, just to remove any doubt, the BBC explainer also mentioned that jihadists are not all exactly the same: they “share the basic aims of advancing Islam, but their priorities can vary”.  An example of such priority is:

“Establishing sovereignty on a territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure) is opposed to Indian control of Kashmir, while the Caucasus Emirate wants an Islamic state throughout the "Muslim lands" in the Russian Federation.”

Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hamas are as similar as two terror outfits can ever be.  Despite BBC’s euphemistic description, the former’s programme goes ‘a bit’ further than just “oppos[ing] Indian control of Kashmir”; they plan to ‘liberate’ all India and ‘reestablish’ Muslim rule over it.  Sounds familiar?

So I got on my laptop again and wrote all this to the BBC.  But when the Assistant Editor came back to me, his answer was an exercise in ‘logical’ contortionism and dishonest obfuscation – causing me to immediately escalate to the highest stage of BBC complaints consideration: the mighty Executive Complaints Unit (ECU).

The Assistant Editor’s response started with the inimitable BBC brand of arrogance:

“We appreciate that it remains your view that Hamas should be called Jihadists.  However we remain of the view that the reasoning outlined in your complaint does not amount to compelling evidence for changing our approach.”

But why not – I hear you crying?  How can an article published by the BBC itself “not amount to compelling evidence” for the BBC?  Well, the respondent pointed out that the BBC explainer I quoted from did not mention Hamas.  It didn’t, of course – and nor did it mention most of the other Islamist terror groups.  The article was entitled “What is jihadism?”; not ‘An Exhaustive List of Jihadist Groups’.

The BBC guy went on to school me in the intricacies of Islamic theology:

“the term itself is rooted in the Quran and often used interchangeably to mean ‘fight’, ‘struggle’, or ‘resistance’, appearing widely in the rhetoric of militant and political movements - including some that are not overtly religious.”

In my letter to the ECU, I once more referred to the Hamas Covenant:

“Art. 7 . . . refers to ‘the struggle of the Palestinians and Moslem Brotherhood in the 1948 war and the Jihad operations of the Moslem Brotherhood in 1968 and after.’ Art. 8: ‘Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes’. Article 13 [states]: ‘There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad,’ and goes on to disparage diplomacy as “all a waste of time and vain endeavors”

Which part of that, I asked, refers to non-violent jihad?  And which part is “not overtly religious”?

Next, the Assistant Editor asserted that there were “a number of fundamental differences in approach” between Hamas and “organisations like so-called Islamic State”.  Which is why, he went on to claim, the latter “not only disdain Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, but have openly labelled them ‘apostates’, declaring them legitimate targets for violence.”

To further school me in the facts of life, the good Editor added links to two articles (one of them by the BBC) explaining the differences between Hamas, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

But, as I pointed out to the ECU, this was

“Another irrelevant ‘argument’: that Hamas, the PIJ, IS & Al-Qaeda are all jihadists needs not imply that they are identical in every respect. The SNP, Alternative für Deutschland, the Catalonian Nationalist Party, Israel’s Jewish Power & the PLO are all nationalist movements – but that doesn’t mean they’re identical or in agreement.

Neither of the two articles linked [in the Assistant Editor’s response] claims that Hamas & PIJ aren’t jihadist; they merely point out the differences between various jihadist groups. One may find articles pointing out the many differences between sharks and mackerel; sharks may even feed on mackerel – but that doesn’t mean they aren’t all fish!

While the IS disdains Hamas, they’re also at odds with Al-Qaeda – yet the BBC does not use this to claim that the latter aren’t ‘jihadists’. In fact, both sources cited [by the Assistant Editor] refer to ‘rival jihadists’. Like other extremists (especially religious extremists), jihadists are factional: they view deviations from the ‘pure’ ideology not just as erroneous, but heretical.”

The Assistant Editor’s letter concluded:

“We can therefore only reiterate that we feel it is clearer to readers to describe Hamas and PIJ as armed groups rather than jihadist.”

I told ECU that this

“is illogical. There are many types of ‘armed groups’ in the world. The term gives the audience zero information: post-7 October 2023, most of the audience already knows that they’re ‘armed’.

This is like calling Trotskyism and Leninism ‘political ideologies’: true, but not informative. Surely it’d be much more edifying to call them both – despite their differences/rivalry – ‘communist ideologies’?”

I also pointed out that, since the BBC did publish an article explaining the differences between Hamas, IS and Al-Qaeda, there was little risk that the audience might be misled into thinking they were all exactly the same.

But the BBC would have none of it.

ECU’s response came signed by… a former Assistant Editor, who had gradually risen through the ranks.  He wrote:

“Having read carefully through the correspondence to date I am not sure there is much to be gained from continuing a relatively academic argument over which definition most closely fits Hamas as an organisation. There will always be debates over how to characterise Hamas – just as there were over IS. The question for a broadcaster like the BBC is less whether there can be a definitive answer to such a question, and more what is the best means to convey the similarities and differences between the different groups in a way that allows audiences to understand their motives, ideologies and background.”

You got that, plebs?  Calling Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad “armed groups” rather than “jihadist groups” is more likely to allow “audiences to understand their motives, ideologies and background”!

So Saith the BBC.  Or, in ECU’s charming language

“This letter represents the final word of the BBC and general complaints of this kind do not usually fall within Ofcom’s remit. But you can contact them if you wish.”

No, it’s not just extreme, disgusting arrogance that permeates that letter – but also intellectual dishonesty and ill-faith.

And it’s far from being a one-off case.  When it comes to Jews, the BBC applies a different ‘logic’, a unique reading of its own Editorial Guidelines and a distinct way of doing things.

The son of a Hamas minister was employed to narrate a BBC documentary on the war in Gaza. 'We didn't know!' claimed the BBC brass, after the boys identity was discovered by a pro-Israel researcher equipped with... a laptop.

When it comes to Jews, the BBC ‘hears anti-Muslim slurs’ that nobody else does.  When it comes to Jews, the BBC pays Hamas families to push Hamas propaganda (as if they wouldn’t do it for free; and as if BBC’s own journalists don’t promote it enough!)  When it comes to Jews, the BBC sees only the most evil of intentions – and smuggle in the ruminations of its ‘International Editor’ as facts.

BBC International Editor Jeremy Bowen: "I've been accused of anti-Semitism [sic!] more times than I have hot dinners..." One of those many times was when Bowen accused Israeli PM Netanyahu of "play[ing] the holocaust card" by acknowledging survivor Elie Wiesel in the audience.

When it comes to Jews – and only when it comes to Jews – the BBC behaves like Völkischer Beobachter, subjecting its audience to a constant stream of antisemitic ‘news’.

Sure, the BBC will say that they ‘cover the war in Gaza’.  But – leaving aside the biased content – which other war did they cover in the same relentless, obsessive way?  The war in Ukraine (one million casualties and counting, seven million refugees)?  How about the war in Syria (500,000 killed, 12 million displaced)?

The BBC has quoted ad nauseam the Hamas ‘report’ of people who died “as a result of malnutrition” in Gaza (circa 200 since 7 October 2023); but when is the last time you read or heard on the BBC about Sudan’s Zamzam refugee camp, where 1 child died every 2 hours?

The BBC is, of course, not the only media outlet that actively promotes antisemitism; it’s just that the others don’t do it on my dime.  In the UK, anyone watching a live broadcast has to pay the ‘licence fee’.  This applies to watching any live channel, through any means (aerial, satellite dish, internet…) and on any device (TV set, computer, smartphone…)  The licence fee is used to fund the BBC but not any other media outlet (so, if you watch live on the internet a TV channel from Zambia or a YouTube broadcast from Burma – you must pay a licence fee to the BBC!)  Not paying it constitutes a criminal offence; it will result in a hefty fine – if not a prison term; and it goes on your criminal record potentially preventing you, for instance, from being employed as a teacher, a social worker, etc.

But even if you don’t watch any live broadcasts, being a UK income taxpayer means that some of your money goes to fund this ‘national treasure’.  You may never use the service – but you’ve got to pay for it.

Not that paying gives one any influence over what the BBC says, does, over whom they employ and promote, etc.  You may believe that BBC International Editor Jeremy Bowen is a talentless piece of dead wood who should at best be working for The Whispering Hedge Weekly (circulation: 15 and growing); but you are still required to fund part of his c. £260,000 per annum salary!

BBC's 'Diplomatic' Correspondent, posted on X on 8 October 2023.

The BBC’s only raison d'être is being a ‘public’ news outlet.  This means that, in return for receiving public funds (while its ‘commercial’ competitors have to work hard to scrape a living), the BBC is supposed to work in the public interest, according to strict rules ensuring accuracy and impartiality – not to mention integrity.

Except it doesn’t.  It’s all a disgusting sham.

Let’s start with the hierarchy: the BBC is led by a Board whose Chair is – in practice – appointed by the sitting Prime Minister.  The other Board members are appointed either by His Majesty’s Government or by the BBC itself.

In turn, the Board appoints the Director-General, who appoints the Directors/Executive Officers.  The Director of News & Current Affairs then appoints the Editors.

So much for ‘checks and balances’.  There is nothing in that recruitment process that truly guarantees BBC’s independence – let alone impartiality and diversity of opinion!

As for ‘public interest’: before 2017, the BBC was ‘regulated’ by the BBC Trust, which was supposed to represent the licence payers.  But in 2017, a new Royal Charter dismantled the Trust, replacing it with the Board and giving the Government more power over the BBC.  As for the licence payers, they are now represented by… nobody in particular.

At the time, the change was spun as an improvement in BBC accountability, as the complaints process was referred to Ofcom – the industry regulator (before 2017, the BBC was outside Ofcom’s jurisdiction).

But that was no improvement – it’s just another lie.  Here’s why:

• Ofcom considers complaints only once the BBC Complaints process has been exhausted (i.e., once ECU has issued a final response rejecting the complaint). But the BBC process is long, tiresome and demoralising.  Complainants either give up or avoid it altogether.  In 2023-2024, no less than 2,709 BBC-related complaints were submitted to Ofcom.  But only 153 (less than 6%) had completed BBC’s own complaints process – the others were generally dismissed by Ofcom with no consideration.
• Ofcom considers complaints according with its own Broadcasting Code, as opposed to BBC’s Editorial Guidelines. The Broadcasting Code is applicable equally to all broadcasters, meaning that – despite being funded by the public – the BBC is not held to higher standards.  Since 2017, Ofcom received no less than 7,133 complaints about BBC bias; only 29 (0.4%) were upheld.
• Ofcom’s jurisdiction extends only to BBC audio-visual content. It does not encompass articles and news items published on BBC websites, mobile apps and social media.  These remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the BBC, which is left to ‘regulate itself’.  Of course, increasingly people read news on websites and apps, rather than watching live TV or listening to the radio.
• Ofcom is woefully underfunded and understaffed. While its budget and headcount have increased gradually, its workload has grown massively.  The number of BBC-related complaints has grown 20-fold since 2017; those specifically about BBC bias have tripled in the past 3 years.  But the BBC is far from being Ofcom’s main headache: in 2023, the UK Parliament adopted the Online Safety Act, which brought a huge expansion of Ofcom’s role.  In addition to its already broad role (further expanded in 2017) Ofcom is now UK’s online safety regulator – covering search engines, social media, user-to-user services, online risks, disinformation and misinformation, algorithmic transparency, as well as assuming responsibility for promoting ‘digital literacy’ among the 69 million-strong British populace.

 

I mentioned the BBC Editorial Complaints.  These are written by… the BBC, of course.  There is usually a consultation, but the BBC does not have to hold one; nor does it have to take on board anything that the consultation brings up.

Such a consultation took place in 2024-2025.  But you’d be forgiven for not having heard about it: despite considerable efforts, I could not find anything on the BBC News website announcing this ‘public’ event.  So – in practice – the BBC also gets to decide who is consulted…

The Guidelines are a long and prolix document – the latest version runs to 448 pages.  One can read there whatever one wishes to read – and the BBC does!  For instance, Paragraph 2.4.7 says

“Opinion should be clearly distinguished from fact.”

Not a BBC original contribution, but a fundamental principle of ethical journalism.

But just a little further on, another Paragraph (2.4.12) states:

“Presenters, reporters, correspondents and on-air editors . . . may provide professional judgements, rooted in evidence and professional experience…”

In practice, I found many instances where BBC “[p]resenters, reporters, correspondents and on-air editors” failed to “clearly distinguish [opinion] from fact.”

Invariably, those assessing my complaints claimed that they were expressing not “opinions,” but “professional judgements,” which they “may” do.

I responded by pointing out that, by definition (see here, here, here), “judgements” are opinions, albeit considered ones.  And that the paragraph that permitted such opinions to be expressed did not remove the obligation to distinguish them from fact.

But, of course, it did not help.  The BBC responded as follows:

“You say ‘Judgements are opinions’. We would say that judgements are sound conclusions which are rooted in evidence.”

That’s it: the BBC writes its own rules; it interprets rules as it wishes; it assesses complaints against itself as it pleases; and it changes the meaning of the English language at its own convenience.  The national anthem should really be called ‘God save the BBC’!

Did I say “assesses complaints against itself”?  The BBC’s 3-stage Editorial Complaints process isn’t fit for purpose.  It’s another sham.

The BBC is obliged (by the Royal Charter and the Framework Agreement) to publish “a framework for handling and resolving complaints”.  That’s another document (52 additional pages I had to read).  Only instead of dealing with how the BBC should perform the “handling and resolving [of] complaints,” the “framework” is primarily concerned with what the complainants need to do: complain in a certain way and not another; within a certain time period; include all the required details etc. etc.  What the Editorial Complaints Procedure does not say is how the BBC should investigate those complaints.  Besides a few woolly formulations (e.g. “we aim to…”), there is no requirement for the complaints personnel to be independent; no obligation of fairness and impartiality; no commitment to investigate beyond ‘giving consideration’.

The BBC only commits to respond within a certain time period, ‘unless it requires longer’ (one of my complaints required more than 18 months to be… rejected by the ECU).  At any point, it can decide to amalgamate hundreds of complaints together and provide one boilerplate response to everybody; it can decide not to investigate a complaint for a variety of reasons; it can even ban complainants if – in the opinion of the BBC, of course! – they complain too much, raise trivial, irrelevant or groundless points, are unduly persistent (“pressing the point”), or God-forbid use “abusive language”.  The banned complainants still have to pay the licence fee, of course!

As we have seen, complaint adjudicators are colleagues of those complained about, who use the first person plural (”we”) to defend the BBC from criticism and accountability.  The Framework promises “an initial response” at Stage 1a and “a response from or on behalf of a BBC manager or a member of the editorial team” at Stage 1b.  This would suggest to a reasonable person that the 1b adjudicator should be higher up the hierarchy, compared to 1a.  But the BBC claims that there is no such obligation, and in practice the same person might respond at 1a and 1b; or one may receive an anonymous response; or a response from someone who isn’t “a BBC manager or a member of the editorial team” and does not state “on behalf of” whom they respond...

Stage 2 (and last) is the pompously named Executive Complaints Unit (ECU).  Naïve persons might take ‘unit’ to mean a group of people discussing, debating and making collective decisions.  But that’s just more deceit: in practice ‘ECU’ is just one person scratching their head, deciding and responding.

At each stage, the BBC is supposedly required “to give an explanation for any decision about a complaint“.  But that’s often ignored, with some responses particularly curt and dismissive.

Finally, even on the exceedingly rare occasions when a complaint is upheld (usually because it’s so blindingly obvious, that the adjudicators can’t possibly wriggle out of it), the BBC isn’t required to do anything beyond applying a minimal correction to the offending news item (which by then may be many months old, forever buried in some godforsaken corner of the BBC News website!)

As a ‘public’ media outlet, the BBC is supposed to hold up the flag of ethical, quality journalism, resisting the temptations of both ‘commercial’ sensationalism and political activism.  It does exactly the opposite: it competes with Al-Jazeera in providing shamelessly skewed, biased content.

The BBC has turned malignant.  And, as usual with such things – Jews are the canary in the coal mine.  These days, the BBC is one of the main promoters of antisemitic prejudice.  It is only a matter of time before its insidious but incessant propaganda – which is already responsible for additional suffering in the Middle East – will cause bloodshed in this country.  UK Government – be warned, or be damned!

Gaza: starved of the Truth

 An unprecedented media and political campaign has been launched, to persuade everybody that Israel is deliberately starving innocent Gazans – men, women and especially children.  The drumbeat is so intense because it aims to drown out everything else – especially the Truth.  And it mostly does.

The photos of Israeli hostages starved by Hamas did not make it to the cover of New York Times or The Guardian...

As usual, the lies are monochromatic and simple to grasp; the truth is complex and uncomfortable.  But that’s no reason to fall for the lies.  Choose the truth.  Here it is.

Question: Is there famine in Gaza?

Short answer: no.  This isn’t an opinion, but a fact that even the BBC was forced to admit, just a few days ago:

“Global food security experts have not yet classified the situation in Gaza as a famine, but UN agencies have warned of man-made, mass starvation taking hold.”

Long answer: ‘Famine’ is not a metaphor, but a well-defined phenomenon.  The international body that defined ‘Famine’ and put itself in charge of declaring it boasts the catchy name of Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).  These are the “[g]lobal food security experts” that the BBC refers to.  The BBC report above is deliberately worded to give the impression that the “[g]lobal food security experts” are different from “UN agencies”.  In reality, the IPC functions as an arm of the United Nations.  Several UN agencies are part of the IPC ecosystem, as are several charities and governmental agencies.  As a result, IPC (which was born out of the best humanitarian intentions) has gradually been politicised.  But, to try and balance the various interests, while also striving to preserve some credibility, the IPC structure includes the so-called Famine Review Committee.  The FRC is (at least in theory) made up of independent experts and acts as a sort of auditor, reviewing IPC-issued classifications.

To make things even more confusing, several other bodies may declare Famine in a territory, based on IPC methodology.  Nobody accredited them to do that, but they do it anyway and the FRC tends to agree with these assessments – unless they are too far fetched.  Such a situation occurred in 2024: in May that year, one of the bodies supporting the IPC ‘determined’ that there was Famine in the Gaza Strip; but in June the FRC disagreed:

“The FRC does not find the . . . analysis plausible given the uncertainty and lack of convergence of the supporting evidence employed in the analysis.”

The IPC/FRC system does two things:

1. Assesses & classifies the current situation;
2. Produces a forecast for the next period.

As mentioned above, currently the situation in Gaza is not classified as famine.  The IPC did issue a forecast on 12 May 2025, warning of “critical risk of Famine” in the next period (April-September 2025).  The document goes on to explain that, from 11 March 2025 (when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire collapsed), the territory had been under a complete blockade:

“Over 60 days have passed since all humanitarian aid and commercial supplies were blocked from entering the territory.  Goods indispensable for people’s survival are either depleted or expected to run out in the coming weeks.”

The “[g]oods” referred above were those provided during the ceasefire, when massive amounts of aid had been delivered into the Strip.  Israel claimed that much of that aid was stashed away by Hamas; it wanted it returned to and consumed by the population before any additional supplies were delivered.

“[C]ritical risk of Famine” means ‘currently there is no Famine, but there very likely will be in the future, unless something is done about it’.  But something was done about it: starting from 18 May 2025 (just a few days after the IPC forecast was issued) aid deliveries to Gaza resumed.  According to Israeli reports quoted (i.e., not disputed) by the IPC, almost 20,000 metric tonnes of food were delivered between 19 and 31 May 2025, followed by close to 38,000 metric tonnes in June and 32,600 between 1 and 23 July.

Yet on 29 July 2025, the IPC issued an ‘Alert’ entitled: “Worst-case scenario of Famine unfolding in the Gaza Strip”.

Most media outlets reported the title above (and embellished it), but without providing a link to the document itself.  So most people have no way to know that this does not mean that there is currently famine in the Gaza Strip.

Just after the ominous title, the document (designed as an infographic) explains:

“According to IPC protocols, an Alert does not classify areas or provide population estimates and does not constitute a Famine classification. [emphasis added]”

Unlike IPC Assessments and Forecasts (which must be based on rigorous scientific data and are reviewed by the FRC), Alerts are political advocacy documents.  They can and often do rely on fishy sources – in this case ‘data’ from the Hamas-run ‘Health Ministry’ in Gaza.  Indeed, the ‘Alert’ states:

“The IPC Global Initiative is issuing this Alert based on the latest evidence available until 25 July to draw urgent attention to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, following the IPC analysis published in May 2025, which detected a risk of Famine.”

In other words, the Alert isn’t based on any new analysis (the latest analysis was the one published in May, before the resumption of aid), but on “evidence available”; which, as the rest of the document shows, is the ‘evidence’ supplied by the Hamas ministry.

The purpose of Forecasts is to establish a scientific basis for action; the purpose of Alerts is “to draw urgent attention” – i.e. advocacy.

But let’s have a closer look at what the IPC is saying: they use rather convoluted phrases such as “Famine unfolding” and “Famine is currently playing out”.  Isn’t this strange?  Why not simply state ‘there is terrible Famine in the Gaza Strip’?

Well, even when engaging in political advocacy, a body like IPC cannot be caught lying.  And stating outright that there is currently Famine in Gaza would be an obvious lie – one contradicting IPC’s own classification.  Hence, they use ambiguous phrases: “unfolding” and “playing out” can be said to refer to the future (they both mean ‘gradually developing’).  At the same time, many people will read them as meaning ‘there’s famine now’.  So the IPC gets effective advocacy without severe loss of credibility: they’re not lying – just misleading.

Additional information: Famine should not be used as a metaphor – it’s a well-defined situation on the ground.

So, if there is currently no Famine declared in the Gaza Strip, why do so many media outlets say there is?  How can they get away with a lie?

Well, just like the IPC, they don’t ‘technically’ lie – they just deceive.

On 21 July 2025, in the course of just 8 hours of ‘live reporting’ on Gaza, the BBC News website printed the term ‘famine’ 3 times.  But, technically, the BBC did not claim that there was famine.  Rather, they quoted ‘sources’ making that claim.  For instance:

“A 15-year-old girl at Shifa says there is a ‘severe and devastating famine in Gaza’"

The other two BBC reports of famine were attributed to unspecified“[l]ocal residents” and to the UN agency World Food Programme (WFP).  The latter claimed “Gaza is facing famine-like conditions”.  “[F]amine-like”, by the way, is a simile – not a metaphor…

Google ‘what is a simile?’ and find out that it means

“a figure of speech involving the comparison of one thing with another thing of a different kind, used to make a description more emphatic or vivid (e.g. as brave as a lion).”

So “famine-like” does not mean Famine, just as “brave like a lion” does not mean the subject is actually a lion.  It's "a figure of speech"...

But most people browsing the news (as most people do, rather than dissecting the meaning as I do) will mentally associate ‘Gaza’ with ‘famine’ and, of course, blame Israel for it.

The IPC, the WFP, the BBC all understand this; they know that there is no Famine in Gaza.  They use ‘famine’ not as a statement of fact, but as a rhetorical cudgel.  They do this because they are, essentially, political activists.  And many political activists are, unfortunately, fundamentally dishonest: they feel that the ‘noble cause’ they strive for justify a few ignoble means – such as being rather ‘liberal’ with the truth.

But corrupting the truth is never a good thing: by giving the false impression that there is Famine when there isn’t, these activists gradually erode their own credibility – and that of the outfits that employ them.  With the ultimate outcome that they won’t be believed when they do report the truth – like the proverbial boy who cried ‘Wolf!’

And there’s something else, as well: by focusing so much attention on Gaza, the activists deny it (along with donations and other resources) to places that are in even direr need.

Following analysis conducted in July 2024, on 1 August that year the IPC declared Famine in parts of Sudan.  By December, it found that Famine was persisting in those places and had expanded to at least 10 additional areas, with 17 others at high risk.

Unlike in Gaza, in Sudan there is Famine, with capital ‘F’: the real thing, not the metaphor.

The Famine in Sudan is the direct consequence of the civil war raging in that country.  C. 9 million people have been displaced; people are unable to gather the crops on which they depend for nourishment.  The warring armed factions have plundered international aid and prevented it from reaching those in need.

BBC News reported on the Famine in Sudan – but only sporadically, in a handful of items spread over several months.  So did other Western media outlets.  There was none of the obsessive fascination with Gaza.  As a consequence, the Famine continues unabated in Sudan, with people dying like flies.

Question: Hold on – I saw with my own eyes on Twitter images of emaciated children, little kids reduced to skin and bones.  Are you saying that those images are not genuine?

Short answer: Even when they are genuine, those photos are fundamentally dishonest.  Those children are wasting away because of disease, not lack of food.

Long answer: Some are not, but others are genuine in the sense that they show actual children from Gaza.  Take for instance this one, published by the BBC on 25 July 2025.  Attributed to Reuters but reproduced by many media outlets (let alone on social media), this is a powerful image, deliberately designed to resemble Madonna with Child.  Christian imagery aside, the vast majority of human beings will be touched by this picture of an obviously starving child – bones sticking out of his pale-bluish skin.  But, before we rage against Israeli inhumanity, let’s read the picture’s caption:

“Samah Matar holds her malnourished son Youssef, who suffers from cerebral palsy, at a school where they are sheltering in Gaza City”

Then let’s ask Google:

“Is starvation associated with Cerebral Palsy?”

Wonders of technology: these days the search engine comes with Artificial Intelligence capabilities.  In less than two seconds, it ‘read’ thousands of scientific articles, returning the following summary:

“Yes, malnutrition and starvation are significant concerns for individuals with cerebral palsy (CP). Children with CP are at a higher risk of malnutrition due to various factors including feeding difficulties, increased energy expenditure, and underlying medical conditions.”

Clearly, it was the disease and not just shortage of food that caused Youssef Matar to look so pitifully emaciated.  One of those diseases that… you know… can’t really be blamed on the Jews.

Some would say that, at least, the BBC had the decency to disclose that little Youssef suffered from cerebral palsy.  But why use that photo in the first place in the context of ‘starvation’ in Gaza?  Most people won’t investigate; they will see the heartbreaking picture and believe it to be the result of Israeli policies, not of a terrible disease.

Little Youssef’s case is by no means the exception: the picture of another little boy is – if possible – even more tragic.  It went viral on social media in mid-July 2025, posted, reposted and commented on (initially, at least) by accounts boasting Iranian flags.  Official Israeli sources identified him as 5-year-old Osama al-Rakab.  Little Osama, who suffers from a serious genetic disease, is no longer in Gaza.  The same Israeli source (COGAT) reports:

“On June 12, we actively coordinated Osama's exit from Gaza with his mother and brother through the Ramon airport.  He is now receiving treatment in Italy.”

And more: on 21 July 2025, the New York Times published the picture of 3-year-old Muhammad Zakariya Ayyoub al-Matouq: another hauntingly thin child, also portrayed in his mother’s arms, in the same Madonna-with-Child pose.  The original photos published by a Turkish media outlet featured in the background the child’s slightly older brother, who looked perfectly normal; but the NYT cropped the brother out of the picture…  Why let such details interfere with a good story?

The BBC did one better: they didn’t ‘just’ publish the photo – they proceeded to interview the photographer, who suggested the photo was representative of the widespread starvation of children in the Gaza Strip.

And it’s not just the NYT and the BBC – the photo appeared in the CNN, NBC News, The Guardian, The Daily Mail…  And no journalist wondered: if this is representative of Gaza’s children, how come we are being sent photos of the same child?

A few days later, it was revealed that little Muhammad Zakariya suffers from a series of severe genetic disorders…

Left: the photo of 3-year-old Muhammad Zakariya Ayyoub al-Matouq (left) and his mother, in a ‘Madonna with Child’-like composition. Right: the same child, who (it turns out) suffers from severe genetic disorders, next to his slightly older brother, who looks perfectly normal.

Unfortunately, in Gaza – as elsewhere – there are some very sick children.  No doubt, war and all the associated hardship makes their situation even worse.  But using those pictures to ‘exemplify’ the starvation of Gaza’s children is dishonest and calumniatory.

Question: And what about the reports that each day Gazans die of malnutrition? Sure, they come from the Hamas-run health ministry.  But are they mere inventions?

Short answer: Again, we are talking about people who died of disease, not starvation.  Their sickness may or may not have been made worse by the general scarcity and hardship caused by the war.

Long answer: Let’s pay attention to the terminology.  Gaza’s health ministry does not actually claim that these people starved to death.  Such a claim would be easy to verify by any pathologist.  No, the official phrasing (not always reproduced as such by the Western media) is that they “died as a result of malnutrition”.  That’s different.  Even in the midst of a terrible war, people die not because they’re shot or blown to pieces and not because they starve to death, but because of unrelated disease.  In some cases, poor nutrition may worsen the disease and bring about or hasten death.  This is what Hamas is claiming: that given a better nutrition these people would not have died of disease (or at least, not in the short term).  Such a claim cannot be verified.  Even if the bodies could be independently examined (but they generally aren’t available for such examination), it is very difficult to determine whether better nutrition would have been sufficient to ensure survival or to prolong life.

One thing is sure: these fatalities – alongside everybody else that died of natural causes in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023 – will be counted among the victims of ‘Israeli aggression’.

Question: So are you claiming that everything is fine?  There’s no hunger, no malnutrition, no suffering, it’s all propaganda and fabrication?

Short answer: No, that’s not what I claim at all.  Gazans are not starving to death, but they experience hunger, disease and horrendous hardship.

Long answer: Starvation means that people do not get enough food to keep them alive in the short term.  Famine means widespread starvation.  That’s by-and-large what happens in Sudan, not in Gaza.

Malnutrition, on the other hand, means bad or improper nutrition.  A person can survive for a long time by eating relatively small amounts of concentrated food: bread, rice, pasta, beans or lentils…  But that’s still malnutrition, because bread, rice, pasta, beans and lentils do not provide all the nutrients that she needs to be healthy.  Malnutrition is currently widespread in the Gaza Strip.  People get enough to stay alive – but they do not get good, proper nutrition.

Additional information: Listening to the BBC and other mainstream media these days, one might think that malnutrition (especially child malnutrition) is a rare phenomenon.  In fact, it is widespread, even outside the context of war.

According to the UNICEF, at least 77 million children in the Arab world suffer from some form of malnutrition.  Even in a rich country like the UK, food poverty causes significant numbers of children to be malnourished.  A 2017 report by The Food Foundation found that “one in 10 children [in the UK] are living with adults who report experiencing severe food insecurity”.

Question: OK, so why doesn’t Israel just open the Gaza border crossings to aid, as much as the UN and others wish to bring in?  Why limit it to the bare minimum?  Why would Israel care if civilians get plenty of food?

Short answer: Because it is impossible to supply the population with everything they need, while also fighting Hamas.  The two activities are incompatible: the logistics of aid delivery at such a scale simply preclude military operations in that territory.

Long answer: Israel’s standard response to the question above is to blame Hamas for stealing aid.  Deliberately denying basic sustenance to the civilian population is a war crime; denying it to the enemy is a legitimate war strategy.  Hence, claim the Israelis, the supply of aid needs to be tightly controlled, to deny it to Hamas and the other terror organisations.

But does Hamas really steal aid?  Western media outlets habitually cast doubt on this (as they do with most other Israeli claims).  The BBC, for instance, states:

“Israel has said an alternative to the current aid system is needed to stop Hamas stealing aid, which the group denies doing.”

And also:

“Israel claims that Hamas stole aid from the UN system. The UN says it is still waiting for the Israelis to back their claims with evidence.”

The BBC, it turns out, continues to promote those doubts, despite the fact that Israeli claims were corroborated by Gazans.  Buried deep inside a video report by BBC Diplomatic Correspondent Paul Adams (a video that is generally very critical of Israel), one finds the following little nugget:

“But Hamas took control of some of the newly arrived goods.  That’s not just an Israeli allegation.  Our own sources inside Gaza have confirmed it.”

This must be blindingly true – if even the BBC let it slip out.  But – I’m afraid – it’s not the entire truth.

Here’s the unpleasant reality: in places like Gaza, it is impossible to starve out Hamas without starving the entire civilian population.  Sure, there are a few terror leaders that may be hiding in tunnels.  But the typical foot soldier (whether Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Mujahideen Brigades, etc.) is indistinguishable from the rest of the population.  That foot soldier seldom resides in tunnels or in paramilitary bases.  When he is not digging out his weapon to try and kill or kidnap an Israeli soldier, he spends his time at home, with wife, kids and often an extended family: brothers and sisters, cousins, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces…  So how exactly can one feed the wife and kids, but not the terrorist husband and father?

It cannot be done – and that’s not really what Israel is trying to do.  Hamas cannot be starved out of Gaza.  But, the terrorists want to do more than eating: if left to its own devices, Hamas would like to control the distribution of aid as a means of maintaining its power over the population of Gaza.

Separating Hamas from its tools of power – not the physical elimination of every single terror operative, nor the complete dismantlement of Islamism as an idea – is what Israel is trying to achieve in Gaza.  Failing in that endeavour would mean that Hamas remained in power in Gaza for the foreseeable future; which would constitute a clear victory for Hamas and an obvious defeat for Israel – however many foot soldiers the IDF ‘eliminates’.

Israeli leaders actually say all this, but not quite as loud and clear; because it is not 100% clear that, in the cold eyes of ‘international jurists’ long-detached from the realities of war, this would constitute a ‘legal’ reason for the tight control of aid.

But even this is not the entire or main reason for limiting aid.  True, Israel must deny Hamas control of the aid distribution; but it could conceivably (albeit with a lot of extra risk, effort and expense) allow more aid in – and still attempt to eliminate Hamas from the supply chain.

But there’s something else here – something that ‘people in the know’ understand, but they’re hiding from you.  The truth is that, in a situation like Gaza, it not possible to keep the population supplied with all the life’s necessities – while also prosecuting the war against Hamas.

It needs to be understood: Supplying 2,000,000 people to the level that the UN and others demand would be a gigantic logistic operation.  The issue is not lorries being allowed into Gaza – that’s just one small step in a long journey; the much larger problem is aid distribution inside the Strip.  In contrast to the US/Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), the philosophy of UN agencies and of the various charities involved in Gaza is that aid needs to be brought to the aided.  That means that the lorries need to travel in many different directions.  They need to take their cargo to warehouses and from there to many hundreds of distribution centres, bakeries and community kitchens.  All that on roads and in areas that must be ‘deconflicted’ (i.e., free of Israeli troops and away from IDF military operations).  If they are not completely ‘deconflicted’, then the result is (as we’ve seen in the past) aid convoys that are either caught in the crossfire or inadvertently attacked.

The UN claims that it needs more than 600 truckloads of aid a day.  It’s a lie; but even if the number were 100, distributing that amount of aid translates into hundreds of truck journeys a day and hundreds of ‘deconflicted’ areas – all that in a territory just 41 kilometres (25 miles) long and 6 to 12 km (3.7 to 7.5 mi) wide.  Roads the military would have to avoid, areas it would have to vacate… Such massive ‘deconfliction’ would not just hinder, but in practice completely paralyse Israeli combat operations.  Not so Hamas’s operations, of course: terrorists aren’t required to ‘deconflict’ anything.

Here's the naked truth that nobody wants to tell you: one can either fight a war in Gaza, or one can keep Gaza’s civilian population well-supplied with food, medicines and other necessities.  One or the other, but not both!

The UN and aid organisations claim that at least 600 truckloads a day must not just go in, but be distributed to the population of Gaza.

The ‘humanitarians’ understand this, as do politicians; which is why both categories of people so keenly advocate a ceasefire.  Even while continuing to bash the Jewish state for ‘not allowing more aid into Gaza’, they know that only when the fighting stops can the aid reach those in need, in sufficient volume and variety.  That’s why the IPC Alert doesn’t just say ‘let the aid get in’; no, the very first of its 5 ‘Recommended actions’ actually demands

“End hostilities: An immediate, unconditional, and sustained ceasefire is critical to reversing the catastrophic levels of human suffering.”

Of course, everyone understands that “sustained ceasefire” is a euphemism.  What the ‘humanitarians’ want is the end of the war, not a temporary ceasefire.  In that, their aims are completely aligned with those of Hamas.  But of course, ending the war and leaving Hamas in power in Gaza is something Israelis simply cannot afford to do: it wouldn’t just mean living in perpetuity with a sword hung over their collective neck – but also admitting a vulnerability that can only invite more attacks from additional enemies.

Question: So what’s the solution?  Are you saying that we must resign ourselves to seeing innocent people suffering and being killed?

Short answer: Unfortunately, innocents will always suffer and get killed in wars.  But it is possible to alleviate that suffering and starkly reduce the number of innocent casualties.

The first step is, simply, to allow those innocents to escape; they are currently cynically trapped in a war zone.  Using a combination of political pressure and economic incentives, Egypt must be persuaded to allow unarmed Gazans to cross into Sinai, where well-organised refugee camps can be established, away from the rigours of war and with full access by aid organisations.

Long answer: Currently, the war in Gaza is the only armed conflict in recent history that civilians have been utterly prevented from fleeing.  While millions of Syrians found refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and further afield, very few Gazans have managed to bribe their way into Egypt.  As I have shown in a previous article, this is a cynical ploy by Egypt and other Arab countries, who fear that allowing Gazans to leave would constitute the end of ‘the Palestinian cause’.  This isn’t surprising; in fact, it’s always been obvious that Arab dictators are very keen on ‘the Palestinian cause’, but don’t actually give a damn about Palestinians.

Even more outrageously, the ‘international community’ (including the likes of Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, as well as media outlets) seems to accept that ‘logic’.  How else can we explain that in 2022 the European Union and the UK opened their gates to c. 6 million Ukrainian refugees, but in 2023 they shut them to practically every Gazan wanting to escape the war?

But if a genocide is taking place in Gaza – as some people claim – then surely the priority should be to take those innocents outside the reach of the ‘genocidaire’ Israelis?  Do these people want to save the victims, or are they only interested in punishing the offenders?  If the latter, what does this tell us about their true motivations?

Yes, I know: nobody but fanatics and a handful of dupes actually believes in this tall ‘genocide’ story.  But, regardless, innocent people are getting killed – because they are forcibly kept inside a battlefield.  Why are they not allowed to escape?

Question: But it isn’t happening.  So I don’t understand how Israel hopes to achieve its goals in Gaza.  You’ve been fighting there for almost two years.  What are you hoping for now?

Short answer: Unsurprisingly, Israel hopes that ‘someone’ (preferably a ‘moderate’ Arab ‘someone’) will take Gaza off its hands, pacify and rebuild it.  Whether this is feasible and desirable is at this point unclear, but no other conceivable alternative promises to deliver what Israel wants: peace and quiet, at least in the medium term.

Long answer: Firstly, “it isn’t happening” because you put no pressure on your government to make it happen.  Rather than just wringing your hands about the suffering in Gaza and bashing Israel for it, you should demand that your government a) pressures Egypt into opening its border and allowing unarmed Gazans to take refuge in the Sinai Peninsula; b) takes in a reasonable number of Gazan refugees – just like it did with Ukrainian asylum-seekers.

Secondly, Israel hopes that at some point, confronted with this perpetual problem and under pressure to alleviate the suffering, a consortium of Arab countries will take over the governance of Gaza and its reconstruction.  Of course, all those countries currently say that they have no intention to do that.  But, as the Abraham Accords demonstrate, such vows are not set in stone.  Given a suitable pretext (for instance, saving the Palestinians from mass displacement and the end of their ‘cause’), the likes of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar may come to believe that they can ‘dress it up’ as a noble – and temporary – gesture.

Would that be a good solution?  I don’t know.  But, when it comes to the Palestinian issue, everybody is running out of ‘solutions’.  Israel has tried ‘benign occupation’; it has tried negotiations and accommodation; it tried unilateral withdrawal; it attempted to ‘manage’ the conflict without ‘solving’ it.  Nothing really worked so far.  In fact, all the ‘solutions’ ended in disaster.

The likes of Starmer and Macron are even worse: they don’t even try anything new – they cling to a ‘solution’ that the Palestinian Arabs have been rejecting for an entire century.  The only thing that changed in the meantime is that in the post-7 October era the vast majority of Israelis reject it, too.  So how do Starmer and Macron hope to achieve their ‘two state solution’?  No, reader, you don’t need to answer that.  It was a rhetorical question; we all know that Starmer and Macron don’t really believe in what they say.  They’d just say anything to get re-elected.

So they are terribly exercised by the rhetorical, yet-to-be-declared famine in Gaza, even while showing no interest in the real, duly declared Famine in Sudan.  That’s because these sleezy, weaselly and unscrupulous politicians have decided to ride the wave of antisemitism, rather than confronting it.

Some have compared this outburst of antisemitism to Germany in the early 1930s.  But a better analogy, I think, is turn-of-the-century Eastern Europe.

The anti-Israel campaign unfolding these days in Europe, Canada, Australia and sectors of the American society is reminiscent of czarist Russia.  Like there and then, it can only lead to pogrom.